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WINK, WINK, NUDGE JUDGE: PERSUADING U.S.
COURTS TO TAKE ACCOUNTANTS SERIOUSLY IN
FEDERAL SECURITIES CASES WITH HELP FROM THE
U.K. COMPANIES ACT
KURT S. SCHULZKE*

I certainly don't want to debate about GAAP.
—Enron Task Force Prosecutor Kathryn Ruemmler1
We live in a litigious society so people would prefer to have prescriptive guidance,
so they can say they followed the rules.
—Anonymous public company CFO2
INTRODUCTION
The 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers reopened wounds many thought
were healed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) in 2002. The Lehman litigation
finally ended in late 2013 with audit firm Ernst & Young paying $99 million to
investors3 who claimed the firm misled them with generally accepted accounting
principles (“GAAP”).4 Other defendants, including banks, officers, and directors,
paid out more than $500 million.5

Associate Professor of Accounting & Business Law and Director of Law, Ethics & Regulation,
Corporate Governance Center, Coles College of Business, Kennesaw State University. Of
Counsel, Slappey & Sadd, LLC, Atlanta, Georgia. J.D., Georgia State University College of Law,
cum laude.
*

Transcript of Sentencing at 18:14-15, U.S. v. Causey (S.D. Tex. 2006) (H-04-025-SS) [hereinafter
Causey Transcript].

1

Ilia D. Dichev, John Graham, Campbell R. Harvey & Shiva Rajgopal, Earnings Quality: Evidence
from the Field 31 (SSRN Working Papers Series, Abstract No. 2103384. 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103384.

2

See Michael Rapoport, Ernst & Young Agrees to Pay $99 Million in Lehman Settlement, WALL ST. J.,
Oct.
18,
2013,
available
at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304384104579143811517891526.

3

4

See infra notes 118-129 and accompanying text (discussing the Lehman case).

5

Id.
231
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The bright line standards of GAAP and SOX were obviously not enough
to protect Lehman plaintiffs or defendants. Why not? The 2006 fraud trial of
Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling offers clues. When asked at trial whether U.S.
accounting principles (GAAP) permitted Enron’s accountants to mislead Enron’s
auditors, Skilling’s accounting expert Walter Rush replied: “[T]his isn't even an
issue under GAAP. GAAP doesn't talk about misleading. GAAP doesn't talk
about integrity. GAAP talks about accounting rules, how you measure assets and
liabilities, what kind of disclosures you make.”6 At about the same time, the
SEC’s Chief Accountant declared that most financial statements are misleading.7
Enron, it seems, was no anomaly.
In leading recent securities cases, federal courts have disregarded or
studiously avoided GAAP and accounting experts, examining more broadly
whether financial statements are “fairly presented” or “not misleading,” thus
dismissing costly accounting testimony as irrelevant and suddenly exposing
defendants—like those in Lehman—to unforeseen legal exposure. Remarkably,
undiluted FASB8 GAAP remains the primary fuel for the analytical engines of
America’s financial markets; and therefore, misleading FASB GAAP financial
statements continue to circulate, misinforming the decisions of investors and
creditors and potentially setting the stage for the next Lehman. With the SEC
again considering a switch to the IASB’s9 IFRS10 accounting system, profound
changes to the SEC’s approach to financial statements deserve serious
consideration.
In January 1932, American accounting luminary George O. May sought to
limit the auditor’s role to telling shareholders whether financial statements fairly
present the company’s financial position and results.11 May used a leading British
Transcript of Record at 16848-16849, United States v. Skilling (S.D. Tex. 2006) (04-CR-25)
[hereinafter Skilling Transcript].
6

7 Don Nicolaisen, SEC Chief Accountant, 2005 PCAOB Standing Advisory Group (SAG)
meeting
(Oct.
5-6
2005),
http://pcaobus.org/News/Webcasts/Pages/10052005_SAGMeeting.aspx (“If I were to opine on
a set of financial statements with my own views, there are few that I would find to be other than
misleading.”).
8

Financial Accounting Standards Board.

9

International Accounting Standards Board.

10

International Financial Reporting Standards.

11 GEORGE O. MAY, THE ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF MODERN ACCOUNTANCY: LECTURES
DELIVERED IN 1932 (1933), reprinted in The Accountant and the Investor, 16 ACCT. HISTORIANS J. 219,
222 (1989). May was Senior Partner of Price Waterhouse and Company’s New York office,
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case, The King v. Lord Kylsant,12 to argue that while selection of accounting
treatments is inherently contextual and judgmental,13 audit opinions should “be so
worded that not only will every statement made therein be literally true, but every
inference which could legitimately be drawn from the language will be warranted
by the facts.”14 Paradoxically, current SEC and professional standards encourage
the opposite.
Federal securities law requires that public company15 financial statements
and disclosures be “not misleading” 16 and presumes that financial statements not
compliant with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) are misleading.17
CEOs and CFOs of public companies must personally certify that the company’s
(a) financial statements are fairly presented, (b) SEC reports, which often include
financial statements, are not misleading, and (c) disclosure controls and internal

Chairman of the American Institute of Accountant’s [hereinafter AIA] Special Committee on
Cooperation with Stock Exchanges, and accounting advisor to the New York Stock Exchange
[hereinafter NYSE]. STEPHEN A. ZEFF, FORGING ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES IN 5 COUNTRIES
122, n. 29 (1971) [hereinafter ZEFF 1971]. This is the first recorded mention of fairly present in
relation to financial reporting in the United States. The phrase “present fairly” has been credited
to NYSE President Richard Whitney. See Stephen A. Zeff, The primacy of "present fairly" in the
auditor's report, 6 ACCT. PERSPECTIVES 1, 2-5 (2007) [hereinafter Zeff 2007]. However, the record
indicates that May anticipated Whitney by one year. The term “results” means “earnings” or
“income.” Hereinafter, the term “auditor” means an external auditor of financial statements
typically prepared by internal accountants denominated hereinafter (mostly) as “preparers.”
However, depending on context, the term “accountant” may apply to auditors, preparers or both.
12

L.R. [1932] 1 K.B. 442

13

MAY, supra note 12, at 228.

14

Id. at 230 (emphasis added).

Depending on context, this article interchangeably uses the terms public company, issuer, and
registrant to signify “SEC registrant.” An issuer is any person who issues or proposes to issue any
security. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) (2014). In general, an issuer becomes an SEC registrant—and must
therefore register with and periodically submit financial statements and other disclosures to the
SEC—when its total assets exceed $10,000,000 and it has a non-exempt class of equity securities
held by 2,000 persons, or 500 persons who are not “accredited” investors. 15 U.S.C. §
78l(g)(1)(A)-(B) (2014). Foreign private issuers [hereinafter FPI], as distinguished from domestic
issuers, with fewer than 300 security holders resident in the United States are exempt from
registration. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(a) (2014).

15

16

See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2014).

17

17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(1) (2014).
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controls over financial reporting are effective.18 These requirements, though
impossible to summarize in a coherent Venn diagram, nevertheless seem to
promise reliable—though not necessarily useful or relevant—financial
information. But even this limited promise is misleading.
SEC regulations and policy guidance do not define “misleading” or
“generally accepted accounting principles” nor do they presume that GAAPcompliant financial statements are not misleading.19 SEC regulations do not
require auditors to opine on financial statement fair presentation or compliance
with GAAP. On the other hand while PCAOB and AICPA20 standards
superficially agree that auditors must opine on both, they diverge over what, if
anything, fair presentation means beyond mere GAAP compliance. The FASB
itself is largely silent on fair presentation but sternly warns preparers to comply
with its GAAP no matter what.
Partly because of these conflicting signals, accountants tend to
superficially equate fair presentation with bare conformity to FASB-promulgated
GAAP (FASB GAAP),21 largely disregarding fair presentation and the “not
misleading” mandates. As a result, today’s standard audit opinions answer a
mostly irrelevant question—whether the financial statements conform to FASB
See infra Part III.A. (discussing required certifications under Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 302 and
906).
18

See generally, e.g., SEC, DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE, FINANCIAL REPORTING MANUAL
(2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cffinancialreportingmanual.shtml (using
the term “misleading” thirteen times without defining it, except with respect to specific
transactions or events). However, a 2003 SEC policy statement purports to declare FASB GAAP
“generally accepted.” SEC, POLICY STATEMENT: REAFFIRMING THE STATUS OF THE FASB AS A
DESIGNATED PRIVATE-SECTOR STANDARD SETTER, FINANCIAL REPORTING RELEASE NO. 70
(Apr. 25, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/33-8221.htm#P25_3300
[hereinafter FR-70].
19

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [hereinafter PCAOB] prescribes public
company auditing standards; private company standards are published by the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants [hereinafter AICPA].
20

21 See Ronald M. Mano, Matthew L. Mouritsen & James G. Swearingen, Accounting profession, heal
thyself: A matter of survival, 73 CPA J., Aug. 2003, at 6, 8 (citing notorious cases supporting the
proposition that accountants too often equate “fairly presented” with “in accordance with
GAAP). This article distinguishes between broadly defined GAAP (the universe of accounting
principles that enjoys some level of general acceptance) and FASB GAAP (rules promulgated by
the FASB at https://asc.fasb.org/). See also ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION subtopic
105-10-05 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2013) [hereinafter FASB CODIFICATION], available at
https://asc.fasb.org/ (purporting to designate the FASB CODIFICATION as the only
“authoritative” source of U.S. GAAP, beginning in 2009).

2015]

WINK, WINK, NUDGE JUDGE: PERSUADING U.S. COURTS TO TAKE
ACCOUNTANTS SERIOUSLY IN FEDERAL SECURITIES CASES WITH HELP
FROM THE U.K. COMPANIES ACT

235

GAAP—while giving lip service to fairness and saying nothing about predictive
usefulness.
Judges, prosecutors, and plaintiffs take the opposite view. Their
preference for fair presentation over technical GAAP compliance is underappreciated by corporate directors, officers, auditors, and their attorneys and
accounting experts, who often seem genuinely surprised by judicial distaste for
and dismissal of GAAP. Some view highly prescriptive GAAP as safe and
predictable.22 Yet, it may actually increase risk on all sides. Brighter lines create an
illusion of certainty in the minds of readers, discourage accountants from
exercising professional judgment, and suggest to courts that accounting experts
are either irrelevant or unhelpful in answering case-critical questions. Who needs
an expert to read bright lines?
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Part I examines
leading securities cases that demonstrate the tendency of federal courts to ignore
accounting experts and to misinterpret accounting literature. Part II chronicles
the ongoing debate over fair presentation and outlines current AICPA, PCAOB,
and FASB interpretations, adducing evidence that FASB GAAP systematically
misleads readers. Part III summarizes relevant U.S. and U.K. statutes and
regulations. Part IV draws conclusions, while Part V closes with related
recommendations suggested by the U.K. Companies Act 2006, the IASB, and the
FASB’s own Concepts Statement No. 8, which may help to restore the
courtroom relevance of accounting experts. While this article addresses only the
weight accorded to their testimony, reserving to future discussion its admissibility
under the Federal Rules of Evidence,23 it may also be helpful in evaluating
admissibility in particular cases.
I. CASE LAW
In Part I, a famous British case sets the stage for consideration of
subsequent U.S. case law which is presented in chronological order. The overall
theme of these opinions is a disregard for accounting standards in favor of
broader fair presentation. Additionally, a line of cases beginning with Basic, Inc. v.
See Dichev et al., supra note 2, at 30-31 (citing evidence that fear of litigation drives public
company CFOs toward accounting rules so prescriptive that they sometimes “don’t reflect the
economic substance of the transaction.”).

22

Qualified expert testimony is admissible if “the expert’s . . . specialized knowledge will help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” FED. R. EVID. 702(a).

23
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Levinson24 is included to elucidate the judicial interpretation of materiality, a
concept essential to all securities cases.

A. The King v. Lord Kylsant
In 1928, Lord Kylsant, a director of Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. (Royal
Mail), published a prospectus promoting Royal Mail debentures. 25 The prospectus
avowed that while Royal Mail had “suffered from the depression in the shipping
industry [like other firms], the audited accounts . . . show that during the past ten
years the average annual balance available . . . after providing for depreciation and
interest on existing debenture stocks, has been sufficient to pay the interest on
the present issue more than five times over,”26 and that dividends were paid in
every year from 1911 to 1927 except 1914.27
However, the prospectus omitted key contrary indicators. While World
War I made the 1918-to-1920 interval highly profitable, thereafter, Royal Mail had
consistently incurred substantial losses and paid dividends in years 1921-1927
only out of non-recurring war-time sources of cash such as tax refunds, “war
contingency reserves,” and a deferred repairs account.28 At trial, Kylsant was
24

Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).

King, L.R. [1932] 1 K.B. 442. . Kylsant’s inferential reasoning doctrine broadly informs U.S.
securities case law but is cited as authority in the United States only by the pre-SEC Eighth
Circuit. See Foshay v. U.S., 68 F.2d 205, 210 (8th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 674 (1934)
(applying the federal mail fraud statute where defendants misled investors to believe the company
was earning regular profits by touting monthly “dividends” actually paid out of invested capital).
E.g., A debenture is a bond secured only by the issuer’s reputation. THOMPSON REUTERS,
Debenture, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/debenture.asp (last visited
Apr.7, 2015). Foshay is cited by subsequent cases involving the sale of securities. See, e.g., Deaver v.
U.S., 155 F.2d 740, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1946); U.S. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676, 678 (D.
Mass. 1942). See also Greenhill v. U.S., 298 F.2d 405, 411 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that honest
belief in a venture’s ultimate success does not justify false representations in the sale of its
securities) (citing Foshay, 68 F.2d 205; Danser v. U.S., 281 F.2d 492, 496-97 (1st Cir. 1960)
(upholding conviction for violating Securities Act § 17(a) where, around Jul. 23, 1954, the
defendant circulated a prospectus dated Mar. 31, 1954 that omitted material intervening losses
known to the defendant); Proffer v. U.S., 288 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1961); U.S. v. Crosby, 294 F.2d
928 (2d Cir. 1961) Linn v. United States, 234 F. 543, 552 (7th Cir. 1916) (where defendant
materially misled prospective investors to believe that he controlled a mine, his honest belief in
the ultimate success of the mining venture was not a mail fraud defense)).
25

26

Kylsant (Lord) np.

27

Id.

28

Id.
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found guilty of circulating a prospectus he knew was materially false with the
intent to induce investment in Royal Mail debentures.29
The Criminal Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the prospectus could
be expected to lead readers to infer that the company was financially sound and
that a “prudent investor could safely invest.”30 The court held that even though
the prospectus was “letter by letter, word by word, an accurate document, so far
as it goes,” Kylsant was indeed guilty of larceny for fraudulently inducing bond
subscriptions.31 In other words, Kylsant’s otherwise factually accurate prospectus
misled readers to infer that Royal Mail’s financial future was bright while
undisclosed negative information suggested it might not be so.
Kylsant was not an accountant but he played a similar role as an
information intermediary. In the United States, George May used Kylsant to argue
that accountants must ensure that “no statement is put forward which is a halftruth or which . . . will probably give rise” to ill-founded inferences.32 May also
argued that while they are not fairly accountable for unwarranted inferences
drawn by ignorant or careless investors, accountants should be held responsible
for inferences that flow naturally from the literal truths of their words.33

B. U.S. v. Simon
The statutory phrase “not misleading” first appeared in Sections 17(a) and
19(a) of the Securities Act.34 Thereafter, it was included in the FTC’s
implementing regulations.35 In case law, the phrase “not misleading” was first

29

Id.

30

Id.

Kylsant was indicted for violating Larceny Act, 1861 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, § 84, which
criminalized the publication of any written “statement or account which he shall know to be false
in any material particular, with intent . . . to induce any person . . . to intrust or advance any
property to [a] company . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. . . .” Id.

31

32

MAY, supra note 12, at 231-232.

33

Id. at 232.

34

Securities Act §§ 17(a) and 19(a) (1933). 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(q), 77(b) (1916).

FED. TRADE COMM., RULES AND REGULATIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, Art. 15
(Jul. 6, 1933).

35
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mentioned in 1936 in U.S. v. Alluan.36 The most influential decision, however, was
U.S. v. Simon which was handed down in 1969.37
In Simon, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld convictions of a
partner, junior partner, and senior associate of audit firm Lybrand, Ross Bros. &
Montgomery.38 The defendants were convicted for “certifying” financial
statements that omitted mention of a $3.9 million related party receivable and the
collateral securing its repayment.39 At trial, the defendants’ eight expert
accounting witnesses—characterized by the appellate court as “an impressive
array of leaders of the profession”—testified that the defendants’ financial
statements were not inconsistent with GAAP except for one relatively minor
error.40 On these facts, the trial court denied the defense request for a jury
instruction that
a defendant could be found guilty only if, according to generally
accepted accounting principles, the financial statements as a whole
did not fairly present the financial condition of [the firm] and then
only if his departure from accepted standards was due to willful
disregard . . . with knowledge of the falsity of the statements and
an intent to deceive.41
Instead, the court instructed the jury that:
the “critical test” was whether the financial statements as a whole
“fairly presented the financial position and accurately reported the
operations [of the firm].” If they did not, the basic issue became
whether defendants acted in good faith. Proof of compliance with
generally accepted standards was “evidence which may be very
persuasive but not necessarily conclusive that [they] acted in good
faith, and that the facts as certified were not materially false or
misleading. . . .”42

13 F.Supp. 289, 291 (N.D. Tex. 1936).
37

U.S. v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).

38

Id. at 800-01.

39

Id. .

40

Id. at 805.

41

Id. at 805.

42

Id. at 805-06 (emphasis added).
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In other words, the jury’s inquiry must start with fair presentation (for
financial position or balance sheet) or accuracy (for operations or income
statement),43 including materiality, and then proceed to culpability against which
GAAP compliance may be a persuasive defense.44The Second Circuit agreed that
the jury was not
required to accept the accountants’ evaluation whether a given
fact was material to overall fair presentation, at least not when the
accountants’ testimony was not based on specific rules or
prohibitions to which they could point, but only on the need for
the auditor to make an honest judgment and their conclusion that
nothing in the financial statements themselves negated the
conclusion that an honest judgment had been made.45
The core Simon doctrine, that fair presentation or accuracy trumps GAAP
compliance in proving securities fraud, has since spread to other circuits.46

C. Materiality
Materiality merits its own sidebar discussion. Materiality is an essential
element of securities fraud because only material information is required to
achieve fair presentation. Yet, despite materiality’s legal importance, neither
statute nor regulation defines it. Attempting to fill this gap, in Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson,47 the U.S. Supreme Court held that “materiality depends on the
significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or

43

Why the court distinguished fair presentation from accuracy is unclear.

Scienter is the “mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). Recklessness may also constitute scienter. See
Dain Rauscher, Inc., 254 F.3d at 856. But see Mattrix v. Sircusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1323 (2011)
(citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3) (2007) (noting that the
Supreme Court has not yet decided whether recklessness amounts to scienter)). Criminal
conviction requires scienter; civil liability generally requires only negligence.

44

45

Simon, 425 F.2d at 806.

See, e.g., SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir. 2011); In re K-tel Int’l Inc. Sec. Litig., 300
F.3d 881, 906 (8th Cir. 2002); U.S. v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1482 n.6 (9th Cir. 1995); McLean v.
Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1085 (D. Del. 1976), rev’d on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.
1979).

46

47

Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 224 (1988).
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misrepresented information.”48 Furthermore, the Court held that an omitted fact
is material if there is a “substantial likelihood” that its disclosure “would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total
mix’ of information available” with respect to the security in question,49 and that
“[a]ny approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always
determinative of materiality, must necessarily be over inclusive or under
inclusive.”50
In 2011, the Court reaffirmed Basic’s total mix test and clarified that
material causality may be inferred from other evidence with or without “statistical
significance.”51 Along similar lines, SEC staff have opined that information may
be material quantitatively, qualitatively, or both.52
The quantitative materiality of forward-looking or contingent information
should be assessed using an expected value framework balancing the probability
of the event and its anticipated magnitude in relation to the activity of the
company as a whole.53 Materiality should not “attribute to investors a child-like
48

Id. at 240.

49

Id. at 231-32 (quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).

Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 236 n.14 (citing H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE,
95TH CONG., REP. OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 327 (Comm. Print 1977) (noting that “absolute certainty in the
application of the materiality concept . . . is illusory and unrealistic”)). Compare Council Directive
2013/34/EU, art. 2, 2013 O.J. (L 182) 19, 28 (defining “material” as “the status of information
where its omission or misstatement could reasonably be expected to influence decisions that users
make on the basis of the financial statements of the undertaking”).
50

Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318-23 (2011) (applying the Basic “total
mix” test in holding that pharmaceutical adverse event reports showing no statistically significant
increased risk of harm from Zinc-based nasal spray were nevertheless material under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which create an affirmative duty to disclose only that material information
necessary to avoid misleading).
51

SAB No. 99, available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm. Quantitative
misstatements of less than 5%-of-basis are often viewed as material.52 Id. (citing as potentially
significant qualitative factors whether the misstatement (a) masks a change in earnings or other
trends; (b) affects the registrant's compliance with regulatory requirements; (c) affects the
registrant's compliance with loan covenants or other contractual requirements; or (d) involves
concealment of an unlawful transaction).
52

Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833, 849 (2d Cir.
1968)). Expected value is the “the mean of a probability distribution” obtained by weighting each
possible outcome by its probability, where the sum of the probabilities of individual outcomes
equals one. See JOHN K. KRUSCHKE, DOING BAYESIAN DATA ANALYSIS 37 (2011).
53

2015]

WINK, WINK, NUDGE JUDGE: PERSUADING U.S. COURTS TO TAKE
ACCOUNTANTS SERIOUSLY IN FEDERAL SECURITIES CASES WITH HELP
FROM THE U.K. COMPANIES ACT

241

simplicity [or] an inability to grasp the probabilistic significance of negotiations”
but should “filter out . . . information that a reasonable investor would not
consider significant.”54 Thus, the scope of legally material information has been
held to exclude puffery and general expressions of optimism.55However,
intentionally misleading press releases have been found sufficiently material to
violate Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.56

D. U.S. v. Skilling & Lay
The collapse of Enron Corporation launched scores of civil and criminal
actions; a comprehensive survey of which would fill a shelf of law review
articles.58 Two earn mention here: the widely publicized criminal jury trial of
Jeffrey Skilling and Ken Lay and the plea bargain and sentencing hearing of
Richard Causey.59 Media and government blamed Enron’s demise on fraudulent
accounting. 60 Similarly, the government’s indictment of Causey, Skilling, and Lay
57

54

Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 234 (quoting TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 448-49).

See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 563, 570 (6th Cir. 2004); Rosenzweig v.
Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 865 (5th Cir. 2003);; Searls v. Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061, 1066 (7th Cir.
1995); In re Sec. Litig. BMC Software, Inc., 183 F.Supp.2d 860, 888 (S.D. Tex. 2001).

55

See, e.g., SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2010) (aff’g
Rule 10b-5-based summary judgment against a defendant that issued a press release describing
technical details and performance characteristics of a wireless communications system while
actually possessing only a description of the system but no prototype or money to build one);
Ponder Indus., Inc., 65 S.E.C. Docket 45, 1997 WL 409773 (July 22, 1997). ( (where respondent
believed his company would receive revenue but knew receipt was subject to contingencies, the
SEC found that he had violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in part by omitting mention of the
contingencies).

56

See Tom Fowler, Ex-Enron CEO Skilling’s Sentence Cut to 14 Years, WALL ST. J., Jun. 21, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323393804578559603861442848.html (citing
criminal charges against “nearly three dozen executives and employees of Enron” and its business
partners).

57

On September 16, 2013, the Lexis-Nexis law review database returned 276 articles containing
“Enron” in the title.

58

Causey was Enron’s Chief Accounting Officer; Skilling and Lay had each been CEO. Skilling’s
case concluded in June 2013 with his resentencing downward to 14 years from 24. See Fowler,
supra note 60.

59

See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Enron's Collapse: The Accountants; Watching the Firms That Watch the Books,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001, at C1 (asserting that “the sudden failure of Enron . . . has generated a
new wave of criticism that corporate accounting is out of control”); Enron: The Real Scandal, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 2002, available at http://www.economist.com/node/940091 (asserting that

60
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repeatedly accused them of “manipulating” or “circumventing” accounting
standards61 in Forms 10-K and 10-Q and related management representation
letters sent to auditors.62
Yet, despite the pretrial accounting hype, at trial the government began
and ended its opening argument denying any accounting connection: “This is a
simple case. It is not about accounting. It is about lies and choices.”63 This
opening could hardly be more misleading.64 It was definitely not a simple case and
was mostly about accounting; the government itself used the root word

Enron’s collapse signals systemic defects in U.S. accounting standards); Mary Flood, Enron’s
Former
Top
Accountant
Arrested,
HOUSTON
CHRON.,
Jan.
22,
2004,
http://www.chron.com/business/enron/article/Enron-s-former-top-accountant-arrested1556608.php (quoting an ETF prosecutor as saying that Enron was “propped up by accounting
schemes”). But see Tom Fowler, Some Say Enron Deserves a Brighter Legacy, HOUSTON CHRON.
(Dec. 3, 2011), http://www.chron.com/news/article/Some-say-Enron-deserves-brighter-legacy2341651.php (quoting observers who argue that Enron’s conduct was not as bad as portrayed).
Enron’s accounting has also been controversial in academic and professional circles. Cf. C.
Richard Baker & Rick Hayes, The Enron Fallout: Was Enron an Accounting Failure?, 31 MANAGERIAL
FIN. 5, 9-23 (2005) (discussing various Enron accounting techniques, characterizing some as
permissible and others not under GAAP); Neville Grusd, The Enron affair from a lender's view, CPA
J., Dec. 2002, at 8 (stating that Enron’s “use of off-balance-sheet partnerships to hide losses . . .
[was] permitted by current rules”); Anthony Luppino, Stopping the Enron End-Runs and Other Trick
Plays: The Book-Tax Accounting Conformity Defense, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35, 69-77 (describing
GAAP on SPEs as “questionable” and “haphazard” but characterizing Enron’s application
thereof as “clear error,” “notorious” and “infamous”).
61 Superseding Indictment at 10-13, 16, 18-19, 24, 31, 33, 52, U.S. v. Skilling Cr. No. H-04-25
(S.D. Tex. Jul. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Skilling Indictment] . The version of events presented to the
Skilling jury may have been misleading because of alleged material misstatements and omissions of
ETF prosecutors. See, e.g., UNGAGGED.net, Attorney Ethics Complaint (Jul. 24, 2012), available at
http://ungagged.net/concealingevidence.php (alleging that ETF prosecutor Ruemmler withheld
exculpatory SEC investigative interview notes contradicting the government’s version of Enron’s
so-called Nigerian Barges Deal).
62

Skilling Indictment at 46-47, 49-53.

63

Skilling Transcript at 347, 394.

See John C. Hueston, Behind the Scenes of the Enron Trial: Creating the Decisive Moments, 44 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 197, 197-98 (2007) (admitting that the ETF’s case was centered on “allegations of
earnings manipulation and disputes over . . . the application of often arcane accounting rules”);
Skilling Transcript at 376 (in opening argument, Prosecutor Hueston telling the jury they would
“hear a lot about Raptors” which were “very complicated financial structures” that “look like
spider webs” through which “the accountants and the lawyers crawled” but which the jury could
ignore because “It's a case about lies, folks. . . .”).
64
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“account” thirty times in opening65 and seventy-nine times in closing.66
Furthermore, while the government did not call its own accounting expert, it
thoroughly cross-examined the two defense experts and used five current or
former Enron or Andersen accountants as fact witnesses on accounting issues.67
Defense experts Jerry Arnold and Walter Rush both testified that Enron’s
accounting was GAAP compliant overall.68 Both, however, also ran into trouble
on issues of critical importance to the jury’s verdict and on the relevance of
accountants in securities fraud cases generally. Early in Rush’s direct examination,
the court undercut his testimony in responding to a prosecution objection, as
follows:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And just as a general matter, a company
such as Exxon [sic], with its size, can you give the jury a sense,
when we're talking about what would be immaterial, what kinds of
dollar amounts would we typically be talking about?
PROSECUTOR: Objection on 403. I just want to make clear
we're talking about accounting materiality?
THE COURT: Yes. I've already explained to the jury, and . . . I'll
reiterate later, in a week or two, the legal definition of
“materiality”. . . . It’s different from accounting materiality that
Mr. Rush is getting ready to explain.69
In other words, as to materiality—arguably one of two words (the other being
misleading) upon which the entire case turned—the $600-per-hour defense

Skilling Transcript at 347-96 (repeating “accountant”, “accountants”, and “accounting” thirty
times).

65

66

Skilling Transcript at 17687-834.

Enron Trial: Profiles Of Prosecution Witnesses, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2006,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113898435336064528.html (summarizing testimony of Wesley
Colwell, Wanda Curry, Sherron Watkins, John R. Sult and Thomas Bauer). Causey was technically
available for either prosecution or defense, but neither side called him to testify. Id.

67

Skilling Transcript at 16441-526, 16716-17823 (reporting the direct testimony of Arnold and
Rush).

68

Id. at 16736-37. According to the trial transcript, the court never returned to define “accounting
materiality” or to cite authority on any discrepancy between it and legal materiality.

69
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accounting expert70 was about to speak a foreign language that the jury must
disregard as a matter of law.
The court’s evisceration of Arnold was perhaps more devastating. Under
cross examination, when Arnold was asked whether Enron investors would want
to know that Enron had a “one billion dollar accounting error on its books,” the
court interjected, “That’s a question for the jury to decide. He [Arnold] testified
as to accounting materiality, not to the issues that will go before this jury.”71
Given the apparent irrelevance of accounting materiality, whatever the court
meant by it, it is unclear why the court allowed Arnold’s testimony in the first
place.72
In Basic, the Supreme Court held that materiality must be evaluated from
the viewpoint of a reasonable investor, not of an accounting expert.73 However,
against Skilling, the government pushed far beyond Basic, calling as witnesses two
“common investors” for the express purpose of providing a “human
perspective,” playing to the jury’s emotions and marginalizing their objective
consideration of materiality.74 The defense called no one in rebuttal75 and, as
explained below, failed at trial and on appeal to defend Basic’s reasonable investor
test.
On direct, Rush testified that Enron’s accounting for reserves and
operating segments were GAAP compliant and free of material misstatement.76
Id. at 16724 (estimating Rush’s witness fees at $570,000). Arnold was paid $600,000. Id. at
16708-09.
70

71

Id. at 16677.

A few months before Enron’s implosion, Robert Prentice prophetically declared, “Unless
accountant experts can take relevant accounting expertise and meld it with ‘accepted legal
theories,’ their testimony will be rejected by the courts and serve no purpose.” Robert A. Prentice,
The Case for Educating Legally-Aware Accountants, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 597, 617-18 (2001).
72

See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text (discussing materiality-related holdings in Basic and
other cases).
73

See Hueston, supra note 57, at 208-09 (admitting that after failing to find a single stock analyst
who had been deceived by Enron’s filings or disclosures, the ETF resorted to “common
investors” to provide a “human perspective” who, while offering “less compelling evidence of
materiality,” would “level the field in the battle for jury empathy”); Enron Trial: Profiles Of
Prosecution Witnesses, supra note 70 (summarizing testimony of former Enron employees John Sides
and Johnny Nelson who lost retirement funds invested in Enron stock).
74

See Enron Trial: Profiles Of Defense Witnesses, WALL
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114416411098516589.html.
75

76

Skilling Transcript at 16724-16823.

S T.

J.,

May

16,

2006,
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Rush also implied that materiality is purely quantitative,77 failing to mention that
materiality may be established either quantitatively or qualitatively, according to both
the AICPA78 and SEC staff.79 This task was left to prosecutor Sean Berkowitz
who finagled Rush into the following clown-car colloquy:
Q: And, sir, the question, I think, is a simple one. Maybe I'm
wrong. If [Enron accountant] Mr. Colwell misled Arthur
Andersen, you're saying that that would be okay under GAAP?
A: No. I didn't say that. GAAP doesn't even -- this isn't even an
issue under GAAP. GAAP doesn't talk about misleading. GAAP
doesn't talk about integrity. GAAP talks about accounting rules,
how you measure assets and liabilities, what kind of disclosures
you make.80
Thus, after the court neutralized both defense experts on materiality, on culpability,
one of the two effectively indicted the U.S. accounting profession as heedless of
integrity and the allegedly misleading nature of Enron’s financial statements.81 No
prosecutor could hope for more.
Two days later, on May 5, 2006, the defense proposed a Simon-based jury
instruction that GAAP compliance is “highly persuasive, but not necessarily
conclusive evidence that Enron's financial disclosures and defendants’ public
statements were not materially false or misleading and that defendants . . . acted
in good faith.”82
The government’s case was based largely on revenue from so-called
“secret oral side deals” allegedly struck by Skilling and Enron CFO Andy Fastow
by which Enron allegedly guaranteed that Fastow’s partnerships would lose no

77

Id. at 16735, 16736-37, 16758, 16759.

78See

SAS No. 47 at ¶¶ 6-7 (1983), available at http://umiss.lib.olemiss.edu:82/record=b1038073.

See
Staff
Accounting
Bulletin
http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm .

79

80

(SAB)

No.

99,

available

at,

Skilling Transcript at 16848-49.

Accountants in IFRS-adopting countries, including the European Union, should theoretically
escape similar condemnation because of “not misleading” and “true and fair view” exceptions
discussed in text accompanying notes 174-75 and 220-21.

81

Jeffrey Skilling’s Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions at 3, U.S. v. Skilling, No. H-04-25,
2006 WL 1316581 (S.D. Tex. May 5, 2006) .

82
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money on specific transactions.83 The government claimed that the oral side deals
rendered Enron’s recognition of revenue from the transactions misleading.84
Arguing that the side deals were legally invalid and unenforceable, the defense
requested that the jury be instructed how to determine their legal validity and
how, if at all, they should be recorded in Enron’s financial books.85
The court rejected the defense’s proposed GAAP and oral side deals
instructions, substituting in their place the following:
A violation of [accounting requirements] . . . should not be
considered by you as a violation of the criminal law.
Whether the defendants followed or deviated from [them] is one
circumstance you are entitled to consider and weigh in
determining whether the defendants had the required specific
intent . . . .86
....
. . . Reliance on the advice of an accountant or attorney
may constitute good faith. To decide whether such reliance was in
good faith, you may consider whether the defendant relied on a
competent accountant or attorney concerning the material facts
allegedly omitted or misrepresented. . . .87
These instructions did not reference GAAP and effectively barred the jury from
relying on accounting or accountants for anything but scienter. On scienter,
remarkably, the jury was free to decide that following “accounting requirements”
could be evidence of criminal intent while violating them could not. In relation to
not misleading, the court defined misleading omissions as failures to disclose “material
information . . . necessary to make an allegedly false statement accurate or

U.S. v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 538-41 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, on other grounds,
561 U.S. 358 (2010) (discussing alleged “secret side deals” in relation to Cuiaba, Nigerian Barge,
Raptor, and “Global Galactic” transactions).
83

84

Id. at 538-41.

See Brief of Defendant-Appellant Jeffrey K. Skilling at 99, U.S. v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir.
2007) (No. 06-20885) [hereinafter Skilling Brief].
85

86

Skilling Transcript at 17650-51.

87

Id. at 17653.
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complete” but offered no definition of misleading statements or fair presentation.88
Finally, on materiality, the court rejected a detailed defense proposal89 and
departed from Basic90 as follows:
[F]or you to find a fact or omission material, the Government
must prove . . . that the fact misstated or the fact omitted was of
such importance that it could reasonably be expected to . . .
induce a person to invest or . . . not to invest in Enron stock.
Assessment of materiality requires you to view the facts misstated
or the fact omitted in the context of all the circumstances,
including the total mix of information made available.
The securities fraud statute . . . does not cover minor or
meaningless or unimportant misstatements or omissions.91
Under Basic, an omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that
its disclosure would have been (not “could reasonably be expected to be”) viewed by
the reasonable investor (not merely “a person”) as having significantly altered the “total
mix” of information available (not merely “could reasonably induce
investment”).92 Some allegations undergirding the government’s case against
Skilling, which the defense characterized as non-specific puffery, have been held
immaterial as a matter of law in other cases.93 Yet, the Skilling court failed to
illuminate these nuances for the jury, who found Skilling guilty of securities fraud
and making false statements to auditors and found Lay guilty on all counts.94
Id. at 17666:14-18 (“Government must prove . . . that each alleged omission of material fact was
misleading because a Defendant failed to disclose material information that was necessary to make
an allegedly false statement accurate or complete, and therefore, not misleading”).

88

See Skilling Brief at 99; Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 552, 554-55 (5th Cir. 2007) (detailing the actual
instruction and the portion of the proposed supplemental instruction enumerating forwardlooking statements, facts already known to the market, and non-specific puffery as “inherently not
material”).

89

90

Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 231-32 (1988).

91

Skilling 554 F.3d at 552.

92

Basic, Inc. 485 U.S. at 231-32.

See Skilling Brief at 95-104 (alleging reversible error in the trial court’s failure to properly
instruct the jury on the legal immateriality of puffery).

93

Skilling, 554 F.3d at 542. Lay died on July 5, 2006; therefore, his indictment was vacated and
dismissed. U. S. v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 870 (S.D. Tex. 2006).

94
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On appeal, Skilling portrayed as reversible error the trial court’s refusal to
“instruct the jury on accepted principles of materiality” especially as to puffery 95
and the legal validity and accounting treatment of the alleged secret oral side
deals,96 but did not challenge the rejection of his proposed supplemental
instruction on GAAP. In affirming Skilling’s convictions, the Fifth Circuit found
that the allegedly immaterial puffery was more than puffery and provided
sufficient evidence for conviction,97 that the trial court’s materiality instructions
were close enough,98 and that Skilling had waived his objection to the lack of
instruction on oral side deals by submitting the proposed instruction on May 10,
2006, long after the court-imposed March 31, 2006 submission deadline.99
Like most defendants in accounting-related cases, Lay and Skilling faced
bad facts, complex and contradictory accounting standards, and inadequate law.
But they also grappled with prosecutors intent on avoiding accounting standards.
For example, at Causey’s post-trial sentencing hearing, Causey argued that his
sentence should be reduced because he had helped convict Lay and Skilling by
collaborating with ETF prosecutors to withhold potentially exculpatory
accounting evidence:
Had we gone to trial, we would have fought the GAAP issue on
the land, on the sea, in the air, I think we would still be in court,
still trying the case. I think everybody, particularly the
government, was advantaged by that . . . it seemed like I was on
the receiving end of hundreds of calls from both sides as to
whether or not Rick Causey was going to be a witness for the
defense or [the government].

95

554 F.3d at 551-55.

96 Id. at 556; see also Skilling Brief at 111-12 (the proposed jury instruction stated, inter alia,
“Written guarantees do affect the accounting treatment of sales transactions. Oral guarantees, whether
legally enforceable or not, can but do not always affect the accounting treatment of sales transactions. Letters of
comfort and verbal assurances not amounting to a guarantee or agreement do not affect the accounting treatment of
sales transactions.”).
97

Skilling, 554 F.3d at 554 (finding that “the statements were not immaterial as a matter of law”).

Id. (finding that the court’s actual instructions “captured most of the substance of Skilling's
proposed supplement and adequately explained ‘materiality’ to the jury”).
98

Id. at 556. The proposed GAAP instruction was submitted on May 5, 2006 and would likely
have suffered the same fate on appeal. The timing suggests that counsel may have initially been
unaware of the accounting consequences of the alleged side deals. Id.
99
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. . . I believe the defense . . . would have liked evidence before the
jury that in the main, the accounting at Enron was consistent with
GAAP based upon what was known at the time by the chief
accounting officer. They didn't call him . . . the net effect was that
the cooperation relationship that he had with the government
kept the accounting case out of the Lay/Skilling trial, which I
think was of inestimable value to the government . . . .100
Prosecutor Ruemmler countered that “having a cooperating witness who is
reluctant to acknowledge their own responsibility is not really of much use to the
government at all.”101 Most significant to this discussion was Ruemmler’s
admission of her deliberate strategy to avoid presenting serious accounting
evidence to Skilling’s jury.

E. U.S. v. Ebbers
From late 2000 to early 2002, Bernard J. Ebbers, CEO of WorldCom,
Inc., orchestrated a series of accounting manipulations to prop up WorldCom’s
stock price, trying to preserve collateral for his personal debts.103 The
manipulations, which added billions of dollars to WorldCom’s publicly reported
net income, included padding projected revenues from so-called “under-usage”
penalties, recording as assets internet line leasing costs that WorldCom had
customarily expensed, failing to deduct marketing commissions from revenues,
and reversing cookie-jar reserves for income taxes.104
102

As WorldCom’s financial hole deepened, Ebbers resigned and the SEC
began investigating. In June 2002, the company publicly disclosed the worst of its
accounting shenanigans105 in response to which which Ebbers’ was later

100

Causey Transcript, supra note 1, at 11-13.

Causey Transcript, supra note 1, at 22:6-8. If the government wants truth, it should insist that
witnesses who believe themselves blameless say so. Id.

101

102

U.S. v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1274 (2007).

103

Id. at 113-14.

104

Id. at 114-16.

105

Id. at 117.
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criminally charged.106 However, despite a wealth of factual detail evincing
accounting irregularities, the indictment alleged no GAAP violation.107
At trial in 2005, a jury convicted Ebbers of securities fraud and willful
false filings under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78m(a), and 78ff.108 Ebbers appealed,
arguing in part that the government should be required to prove that the disputed
accounting violated GAAP because “where a fraud charge is based on improper
accounting, the impropriety must involve a violation of GAAP, because financial
statements that comply with GAAP necessarily meet SEC disclosure
requirements.”109
The Second Circuit disagreed, affirming Ebbers’ convictions, citing Simon
for the proposition that “even where improper accounting is alleged, the statute
requires proof only of intentionally misleading statements that are material,”110
defining “intentionally misleading statement” as one “designed to affect the price
of a security,”111 and holding that the government was not obligated “to prevail in
a battle of expert witnesses” over technical GAAP compliance.112 Construing the
term “misleading,” the court pointed to WorldCom’s undisclosed changes in
revenue and cost accounting policies which falsely led investors to infer that
Worldcom’s current reported revenues and costs had been calculated just as
before.113 In this sense, whether the financial statements were misleading was not
a function of the accounting principles followed but of the failure to disclose
period-to-period changes in those principles.

F. U.S. v. Rigas
Adelphia Communications Company (Adelphia) was founded by John
Rigas in the early 1950s, went public in 1986, and had grown into one of largest

106

Id. at 117, 125.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 117.

109

Id. at 125.

110

Id. (citing U.S. v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805-06 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970)).

111 Id. Because “design” is manifestly a function of scienter and “material” is not a function of
“design,” the court most likely meant the word “designed” to interpret “intentionally,” not
“material”. Id.
112

Id. at 126-27.

113

Id. at 126.
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cable TV systems in the United States by 2001.114 Between March 1998 and
September 2001, Adelphia’s publicly disclosed bank borrowings grew six-fold to
$5.4 billion.115 At the same time, on the advice of Adelphia’s audit firm, Deloitte
& Touche,116 Adelphia’s financial statements did not disclose an additional $2.3
billion owed, under a so-called “co-borrowing” arrangement, by other companies
owned by the Rigas family for which Adelphia was contingently liable117 but did
not expect to pay.118
In August 2001, on the basis of only the publicly disclosed debt, Moody’s
Investors Service labeled Adelphia one of the country’s most highly leveraged
cable TV companies.119 On March 27, 2002, in response to the unraveling of
Enron and ensuing changes to SEC policies, Adelphia first disclosed the $2.3
billion in a press release announcing its 2001 annual financial results.120 That day,
Adelphia’s stock closed down about 25 percent, at $20.39 per share, and was
delisted in May 2002 at $1.16.121
At the inception of the ensuing investigation, John Rigas and sons,
Timothy and Michael, were indicted for securities fraud and conspiracy to
114

U.S. v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1471 (2008).

115

Id.

Id. At trial, no evidence was adduced to suggest that John Rigas was involved in decisions
about Adelphia’s disclosure of the contingent liabilities and no witness testified to any
misstatement on any subject by John Rigas. See Joint Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 102
[hereinafter Rigas Joint Brief], United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 05-cr3577), 2006 WL 1721265.

116

Rigas, 490 F.3d at 212 n.2. According to relevant FASB GAAP (then and now), contingent
liabilities, like guarantees of others’ indebtedness, must not be recorded (“recognized” or
“accrued”) as liabilities on the balance sheet unless, at the balance sheet date, they are probable to
occur and the amount can be reasonably estimated. FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 5 ¶ 8 [hereinafter SFAS No. 5] (2010). Footnote “disclosure” of
unrecognized but “reasonably possible” contingencies is required, while disclosure of merely
remote contingencies is optional, Id. at ¶ 10, except for guarantees of the indebtedness of others,
which must be disclosed. Id. at ¶ 12.

117

Rigas, 490 F.3d at 212 n.2 (reproducing the footnote in the March 27, 2002 press release that
disclosed the $2.3 billion contingent liability and stated that Adelphia “does not expect . . . to
repay the amounts borrowed”).

118

119

Rigas, 490 F.3d at 213.

120

Id. at 212 n.2.

121

Id. at 212.
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commit securities fraud.122 Paragraph 67 of the indictment alleged an apparent
evidentiary cornerstone of the government’s case: “Pursuant to GAAP, Adelphia
was required . . . to disclose the full amount of its joint and several liabilities
under the Co-Borrowing Facilities in the notes accompanying its financial
statements.”123
Despite the indictment’s express invocation of GAAP, at trial, the
government deliberately avoided it, offering no expert testimony or other
evidence of actual GAAP requirements.124 Instead, the prosecution sought to
prove that Adelphia’s failure to disclose the contingent liabilities prior to March
27, 2002 was materially misleading in the Basic sense: that these contingencies
would be significant in the mind of a reasonable investor.125 In essence, the
government’s case replaced whatever GAAP might say with Simon’s mandate:
Don’t mind GAAP. Just don’t mislead.
The defense offered no GAAP evidence, perhaps assuming it unnecessary
because the prosecution proved no GAAP violation. This strategy deprived the
jury of evidence, if any, of the defendants’ good faith reliance on GAAP.126 In
July 2004, the jury found John and Timothy Rigas guilty of securities fraud and
conspiracy.127
On appeal, the defendants argued that the government should have been
required to introduce SFAS No. 5 into evidence and to call an accounting expert
to explain it128 because, unlike in Simon, the Rigas prosecutors alleged “accounting
malfeasance” controlled by a specific accounting rule.129 The Second Circuit
upheld the convictions, citing Simon and Ebbers to the effect that violation of
accounting standards was not an element of the charged securities fraud130 and
Indictment at 29 [hereinafter Indictment], U.S. v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02cr-1236), 2002 WL 32153610.
122

123

Indictment at 29.

124

See Rigas Joint Brief at 49.

125

Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988).

Rigas, 490 F.3d at 220 (holding that while GAAP may be relevant to a defendant's good faith
effort to comply with GAAP or reliance upon an accountant's advice thereon may negate scienter,
nevertheless, the statte alone establishes the elements of fraud).
126

127

Id. at 211.

128

Id. at 219-20.

129

Id. at 220.

130

Id.
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that, even if the defendants had complied with GAAP, a jury could find that they
had intentionally misled investors.131 Rigas thus reaffirmed and even expanded
Simon’s doctrine of GAAP irrelevance to include financial statement fraud
governed by specific accounting standards.132

G. In Re Lehman Bros. Securities
Just as in criminal cases, courts have disregarded FASB GAAP in notable
civil ones. In re Lehman Bros. Securities & ERISA Litigation illustrates both the
judiciary’s accounting expertise deficit and the folly of requiring mechanical,
fairness-free adherence to prescriptive GAAP. The plaintiffs alleged that
Lehman’s financial statements were misleading in that they violated SFAS No.
140—which governed accounting for assets used as collateral in so-called “Repo
105” transactions—because, in the absence of a “true sale at law” opinion from a
U.S. law firm, Lehman treated quarter-end Repo 105 transactions as sales rather
than as borrowings thereby causing the “repetitive, temporary, and undisclosed
reduction” of Lehman’s “net leverage” indebtedness metric.133 In the plaintiffs’
view, a true-sale opinion from U.K. law firm Linklaters was insufficient to
support sale treatment.134 The court disagreed, finding no SFAS No. 140 violation
but that a jury might find that the statements violated the Second Circuit’s selfconcocted FASB GAAP “requirement that the [financial] statements as a whole
accurately reflect the financial status of the company.”135
One of the most striking aspects of the Lehman case was Lehman’s
transoceanic manipulation of a bright-line, post-Enron, SOX-era accounting
standard. SOX was supposed to prevent future Enrons. Yet, for Lehman, the
bright lines of SFAS No. 140 and concomitant prohibitions against fair
presentation overrides facilitated deception. The court responded by unilaterally
rewriting GAAP in the image of Simon and the FASB quickly drew new bright

131

Id. at 221.

The court also inexplicably quoted what it called the “relevant part” of SFAS No. 5, Rigas, 490
F.3d at 220 n.14, but omitted paragraph 8 thereof which explains how contingent liabilities should
be recorded or disclosed depending on their likelihood. Id.

132

133

In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 258, 276-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

134

Id. at 278.

In re Lehman Bros., 799 F. Supp. 2d at 279 n. 127 (misconstruing an AICPA private-company
auditing standard as a 2008 accounting standard for public companies).

135
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lines, amending SFAS 140 in a tacit admission that the old bright lines were
misleading.136
In another 2011 opinion, SEC v. Todd, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its
continuing adherence to Simon in reinstating a civil fraud verdict137 against
Gateway Incorporated’s CFO for recklessly misrepresenting Gateway’s year 2000
revenues. The trial court had overturned the verdict as a matter of law in part
because the SEC’s accounting expert, Professor Arnold (of Skilling fame), cited
no GAAP proscribing the defendant’s recognition of revenue in the
circumstances.138 The Ninth Circuit held that whether or not the disputed revenue
technically complied with GAAP, the evidence supported the jury’s conclusion
that its recognition was materially misleading.139 The SEC has similarly
sidestepped GAAP in more than one hundred administrative cases since 1995.140

H. Case law synthesis
U.S. case law treats financial statements as an information portal through
which preparers and auditors present selected factual assertions from which
readers may choose in forming logical inferences about the company’s past
performance and future prospects. Reports filed under Section 13 must be true
and correct,141 must not be false or misleading,142 and negligence is sufficient to
136 See STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 166: ACCOUNTING FOR
TRANSFERS OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AN AMENDMENT OF FASB STATEMENT NO. 140 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 2009); Justin Chircop, Paraskevi Vicky Kiosse & Ken Peasnell, Should
Repurchase Transactions be Accounted for as Sales or Loans?, 26 ACCOUNTING HORIZONS 657, 663-66
(2012) (describing Lehman’s Repo 105 accounting and responsive changes to FASB GAAP).
137

SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2011).

138

Id. at 1216.

Id. at 1217 (citing U.S. v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1482 n.6 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Adherence to GAAP
would obviously qualify as weighty exculpatory evidence; it does not, however, necessarily shield
one from [ ] liability.”) (citing U.S. v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 785-86 (9th Cir. 1978); Monroe v.
Hughes, 31 F.3d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1994))).
139

See, e.g., In Re Sony Corporation and Sumio Sano, SEC Release No. 34-40305 (Aug. 5, 1998),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/3440305.txt (fining Sony $1 million for falsely reporting its
Pictures and Music Entertainment subsidiaries as one entertainment segment in GAAP-compliant
financial statements); In Re The Coca-Cola Company, Securities Act Rel. 8569 at 8-9 (Apr. 18,
2005), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8569.pdf (sanctioning Coca-Cola for failing to
inform readers that its GAAP-compliant income statement masked unsustainable Japanese syrup
sales). For further information on side stepping of the GAAP, see Spreadsheet of Admin. Cases,
(on file with the Author) (2015).
140

141

U.S. v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1298 (2d Cir. 1991).
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prove civil violation of Section 13(a).143 When the mix of facts presented in and
omitted from financial statements can reasonably be expected to lead investors
toward materially false inferences, the statements have been found misleading and
therefore in violation of securities statutes or regulations.144
GAAP compliance is not an element of civil or criminal claims or
charges and is not a guarantee that financial statements are not misleading.146
Financial statements that have not been proven to violate GAAP have
nevertheless been found materially misleading.147 Yet, dicta suggest that proof of
compliance with GAAP may be “very persuasive” evidence that audited financial
statements are not materially misleading or, if they are misleading, that the
preparers or auditors nevertheless published them in good faith.148 The legal
application of GAAP and auditing standards is hampered by the fact that Courts,
prosecutors and defense counsel often misconstrue or avoid them, as illustrated
by Ebbers, Skilling, and Lehman.149 The fact and materiality of misleading statements
145

142

See SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

143

See SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

See, e.g., U.S. v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1274 (2007)
(pointing to failure to disclose changes in accounting policies as falsely leading investors to infer
no such changes); U.S. v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 221 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding a jury verdict that
failure to disclose contingent guarantee of a related party’s debt was materially misleading); SEC v.
Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding a jury verdict that revenue recorded
on lease-back transactions structured to have zero cash-flow impact was misleading); U.S. v.
Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 800-01 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 1006 (1970) (holding that
omission of information about collateral underlying a receivable could mislead investors to overvalue the receivable).

144

145

See, e.g., Rigas, 490 F.3d at 220.

146

See, e.g., id. at 221.

See, e.g., supra Part I (discussing Simon, 425 F.2d 796; U.S. v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir.
2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, on other grounds, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5259 (2010); Ebbers, 458 F.3d
110; Rigas, 490 F.3d. 208; Todd, 642 F.3d at 1217; In Re Sony Corporation and Sumio Sano, SEC
Release No. 34-40305 (Aug. 5, 1998), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/3440305.txt; In Re
The Coca-Cola Company, Securities Act Rel. 8569 at 8-9 (Apr. 18, 2005),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8569.pdf).

147

148

See Simon, 425 F.2d at 805.

See Ebbers, 458 F.3d at 126. Similarly, a recent study found that federal judges complied in less
than 14 percent of studied cases with a statutory requirement to certify that attorneys comply with
Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in all securities cases. M. Todd Henderson &
William H. J. Hubbard, Do Judges Follow the Law? An Empirical Test of Congressional Control Over

149
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and omissions are treated as questions of fact amenable to expert testimony
under FRE 702. While Supreme Court precedent constrains materiality to
information objectively significant to a reasonable investor,150 some lower courts
have subjectively redefined it as significant to an investor.151
II. FAIR PRESENTATION CHRONICLE AND STANDARDS

A. Debating Fair Presentation
1. Fair Presentation Chronicle
The debate over the role and meaning of financial statement fair
presentation, key historical inflection points of which are highlighted here,152 has
been ongoing since at least January 1933, when NYSE President Richard Whitney
asked listed companies to obtain outside audit opinions on whether their 1932
balance sheets and income statements fairly presented their financial position and
results; whether the accounts were fairly determined through “consistent application
of the system of accounting regularly employed by the company”; and whether
the company’s “system” conformed to “accepted accounting practices” and five
broad principles which, endorsed by the American Institute of Accountants

Judicial Behavior (2 U. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ. Res. Paper No. 671, 2014),
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377351.
See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13–317, 2014 U.S. Lexis 4305, at ***42
(Jun. 23, 2014) (citing Amgen v. Conn. Ret. & Trust Funds, 2013 U.S. Lexis 1862, at ***22 (2013))
(holding that materiality is an objective question in securities cases); Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v.
Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318, 1323 (2011) (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232
(1988) (defining materiality through the eyes of a reasonable investor)).
150

See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 62-72, 82-92 (discussing materiality as applied in U.S. v.
Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2009)).
151

Details are chronicled elsewhere. See, e.g, Zeff 2007, supra note 8; Stephen A. Zeff, Arthur
Andersen & Co. and the two-part opinion in the auditor's report: 1946-1962, 8 CONTEMPORARY ACCT.
RESEARCH 448 (1992) [hereinafter Zeff 1992]; Zeff 1971, supra note 8.
152
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(AIA),153 had “won fairly general acceptance” and thus deserved universal
application.154
In May 1933, Congress very quickly passed the Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act)155 ostensibly to “provide full and fair disclosure of the character
of [covered] securities.”156 Commenting on the paucity of congressional debate
over the Securities Act, one observer wrote, “There was virtually no dissent . . .
[House Speaker Sam] Rayburn remarked he did not know whether the bill passed
so readily because it was damned good or so damn incomprehensible.”157
Hindsight suggests the latter.
Section 19 authorized the FTC to prescribe related accounting
methods.158 FTC regulations required registration statements to include a balance
sheet and income statements distinguishing between recurring and non-recurring
income.159 Statements were to be certified by an “independent public or certified
accountant”160 to the effect that the statements therein were true and not

Letter from Richard Whitney, President, NYSE, Jan. 31, 1933, in AUDITS OF CORPORATE
ACCOUNTS, CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CO-OPERATION WITH
STOCK EXCHANGES OF THE AIA AND THE COMMITTEE ON STOCK LIST OF THE NEW YORK
STOCK
EXCHANGE
13
(emphasis
added),
available
at
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/1934_0121_AuditsCorporateT.pdf.
[hereinafter CORRESPONDENCE].

153

Letter from AIA Special Committee to NYSE Committee on Stock List, Sep. 22, 1932, in
CORRESPONDENCE at 7-9.

154

Securities Act of 1933, H.R. 5480, 73d Cong. (1933), available
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/1933_05_27_Securities_Act.pdf.
[hereinafter “Securities Act”].

155

156

at

Securities Act, supra note 148, at preamble.

Letter from Benjamin V. Cohen to James Landis, May 5, 1933, available at Papers, SECURITIES
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
HISTORICAL
SOCIETY,
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/1933_05_05_Cohen_to_Landis_t.pdf.

157

AND

Securities Act § 19(a) (1933). The power to set or “recognize” accounting standards in
registration statements now resides with the SEC. Securities Act § 19(a) (2012),
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sa33.pdf.

158

159

Securities Act, supra note 148, at § 7 and Schedule A, ¶¶ 25-26.

160

Id.
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misleading.161 In January 1934, J.M.B. Hoxsey, Executive Assistant to the NYSE
Committee on Stock List, wrote as to a proposed audit opinion template, “[T]he
Exchange . . . is not concerned with minor questions of form or with petty
details, but with the substantial accuracy and fairness of accounts.”162
The Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) followed.163 Arguing against
proposed Section 18(b), which would empower the SEC to dictate accounting
standards,164 George May wrote: “There is no dispensing with judgment in the preparation
of accounts . . . In so far as principles of accounting are necessary . . . corporations
should be allowed to exercise judgment provided that they recognize certain
fundamental principles . . . definitely laid down and consistently followed.”165 The
AIA added that “[u]niform financial statements simply will not solve the problem.
They might look alike, but . . . would not mean the same things. Investors would
be deceived, rather than protected, by such requirements.”166
Nevertheless, accountants busily set about standardizing accounting
principles and audit reports while conflating compliance and fair presentation. In
1942, the SEC warned accountants that GAAP should not “blind us to the basic
question, whether the financial statements performed the function of
enlightenment, which is their only reason for existence.”167 One audit firm,

161 FTC, Rules and Regulations Under the Securities Act of 1933, Art. 14-16 (Jul. 6, 1933)
(emphasis
added),
available
at
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/1933_0706_FTC_RulesRegs.pdf.

Letter from J.M.B. Hoxsey to Edwin F. Chinlund, Chairman, Controllers Institute of America,
Jan. 18, 1934, in CORRESPONDENCE at 30.
162

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) § 4, H.R. 9323, 73d Cong. (1934), available
at http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/1934_06_06_Securities_Exchan.pdf.
163

The accounting profession inexplicably did not object on the record to the grant of similar
power to the FTC by Securities Act § 19.
164

165 Memorandum from George O. May to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency
4-5 (Mar. 10, 1934) (on file with author). May also argued that “broadly speaking, the shorter the
[reporting] period the greater relatively becomes the possible margin of error . . . .” Id. at 5-7.

Press
Release,
AIA
(Mar.
11,
1934),
available
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/1934_0311_ImpositionUniformT.pdf.
166

at

In re Assoc. Gas & Elec. Co., 11 SEC 1058, August 4, 1942 quoted in Address by John C.
Burton, “Fair Presentation: Another View,” Baruch College of the City University of New York at
n.9
and
accompanying
text
(Feb.
18,
1975),
available
at
http://www.baruch.cuny.edu/library/alumni/online_exhibits/digital/saxe/saxe_1974/burton_75
.htm. See also Samuel H. Gruenbaum and Marc I. Steinberg, Accountants' Liability and Responsibility:
Securities, Criminal and Commmon Law, 13 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 247, 263 (1980) (“Enlightenment
167
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Arthur Andersen, took this warning to heart. By 1946, all Andersen audit
certificates opined separately on fair presentation and conformity with GAAP.168
In 1957, Andersen partners formally voted for separate fair presentation
opinions,169 thereby triggering the 1950s equivalent of a blog war. AICPA
Director of Research Carman G. Blough struck first. Referring scandalously to “a
firm” (Andersen) who believed financial statements could conform with GAAP
yet not present fairly,170 he decried this “most unfortunate” heresy and warned
inscrutably that henceforth no one could challenge an auditor’s “fairness or his
integrity, only his judgment.”171 Andersen partner Maurice E. Peloubet countered
that equating “present fairly” with GAAP conformity was an abdication of
professional responsibility.172 Yet, by late 1962, Andersen had capitulated,173
primarily to win the audit of Houston-based Superior Oil Co.174 Forty years later,
a similar capitulation to another Houston oil client would destroy the firm.
Andersen’s retreat did not end the controversy, as the problem returned
with vigor in the 1970s. In November 1972, the AICPA published Statement on
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 1 declaring that fairly presented financial
statements must conform to GAAP and be materially not misleading.175 In July
1973, the FASB was formed and authorized by the AICPA to promulgate

means more than mathematical or literal accuracy. Taken as a whole, financial statements must
fairly present the financial status of a company.”).
168

Zeff 1992, supra note 145, at 449.

169

Id. at 453-55.

170

Carman G. Blough, Implications of “present fairly” in the auditor’s report, J. ACCT., Mar. 1958 at 76.

171

Id.

Maurice E. Peloubet & Carman G. Blough, More about "present fairly" in the auditor's report, J.
ACCT., May 1958 at 73-74.

172

173

Zeff 1992, supra note 145, at 462.

Superior Oil “expensed” drilling costs, whereas Andersen favored “capitalizing” or recording
them as assets. Id. at 464.

174

STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS (1975) [hereinafter SAS] NO. 1, § 511.01. The “not
misleading” phrase suggests that SAS No. 1 may have been partly a reaction to the Second
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006
(1970). See Zeff 2007, supra note 8, at 5 (stating that in 1972 the AICPA’s Committee on Auditing
Procedure, “probably influenced” by Simon, recommended deletion of “fairly” from the audit
report).

175
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accounting principles.176 In December, the SEC issued a non-rule policy,
Accounting Series Release (ASR) No. 150, announcing—without notice or
comment—that the SEC would henceforth treat FASB-promulgated GAAP as
authoritative and other GAAP as not so.177 A mere eighteen months later, SEC
Chief Accountant John C. Burton opined that “[F]airness means more than
following a set of specific rules, standards, and guidelines. Accounting cannot be
viewed as a mechanistic process and remain either professional or
communicative” and that fair presentation “cannot be defined by simple
references to [GAAP] . . . . [T]he objectives of financial statements . . . have an
important bearing on the meaning of ‘present fairly.’”178
In 1975, the AICPA characterized GAAP as “relatively objective”
because “auditors usually agree on their existence” but allowed that identification
of GAAP “requires judgment.”179 In 1976, Arthur Andersen petitioned the SEC
to revoke ASR No. 150 and then sued unsuccessfully to enjoin its enforcement.180
Roughly twenty-five years later, with FASB GAAP bright lines running in
all directions, cascading revelations of edgy accounting, sketchy corporate
governance, and foolish business decisions drove Enron’s stock price below $1
per share on November 28, 2001.181 The Enron collapse, along with similar
catastrophes at Worldcom and Adelphia, prompted Congress to pass the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)182 on July 25, 2002.183

See Ronald E. Large, Note, SEC Accounting Series Release No. 150: A Critical Analysis, 54 IND. L.J.
317 at n.3, available at http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol54/iss2/7.
176

SEC Accounting Series Release No. 150 2 (Dec. 20, 1973), available at
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1970/1973_1220_SECAccounting.pdf (quoting
SEC Accounting Series Release No. 4 (1938) to the effect that “accounting practices for which
there [is] no substantial authoritative support [are] presumed to be misleading”).
177

178

Burton, supra note 160.

SAS No. 5, ¶ 5 (1975) (“[T]here may be unusual circumstances in which the selection and
application of specific accounting principles from among alternative principles may make the
financial statements taken as a whole misleading.”). SAS No. 5 ¶ 9.
179

180

See Large, supra note 169, at 317-19.

181

See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM (2003).

182 107 CONG. REC. E1412 (Jul. 29, 2002) (speech of Rep. DeGette) (citing Enron, Worldcom,
and Adelphia cases as the motivating force behind passage of H.R. 3763).
183 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (codified in portions of 11, 15,
18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SOX], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW107publ204/pdf/PLAW-107publ204.pdf. The enrolled H.R. 3763 was signed in the House of
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The primary contributions of SOX to the fair presentation debate were
more bright lines. Section 101 formed and misnamed the PCAOB;184 Section 108
ordered the SEC to designate a setter of GAAP; and Sections 302, 304 and 906,
further discussed in Part III, introduced civil and criminal financial statement
certification regimes for CEOs and CFOs but not for auditors.
In April 2003, with no notice or comment, the SEC published FR-70
reaffirming the FASB as “a designated private-sector” setter of GAAP and
declaring FASB standards “generally accepted” for purposes of SOX Section
108.185
In 2005, the FASB moved to supplant GAAP with FASB GAAP,
proposing to end the AICPA’s GAAP custodianship186 and asserting that since
“[T]he selection of [FASB GAAP] results in relevant and reliable financial
information,” no enterprise may claim that its non-FASB-GAAP financial
statements are GAAP compliant.187
The FASB’s claim to a GAAP and fair presentation monopoly provoked
an international firestorm. The Federation of European Accounting Experts
(FEE) wrote:
The proposed [FASB] statement does not address the relation
between “hierarchy” and the “fair presentation” whereas [the]
“fair presentation” principle can be seen as the overarching
Representatives on July 25, 2002. 107 CONG. REC. H5787 (daily ed. Jul. 25, 2002) (report of Mr.
Trandahl, Clerk of the House).
Because the PCAOB has authority over public company auditing standards, not accounting
standards, the “A” in PCAOB should logically represent “auditing.” The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, executed July 21, 2010, added nothing to the
fair presentation debate, available at https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf.

184

FR-70, supra note 15. FR-70 is explicitly not an agency rule and has not been published in the
Federal Register or Code of Federal Regulations. Id. See also Wanda A. Wallace, Commentary: With
or without due process?, ACCT. TODAY, Nov. 26, 2007, n.p., available at
http://www.accountingtoday.com/ato_issues/2007_21/25983-1.html (objecting to the SEC’s
apparent violations of due process in issuing FR-70 and multiple SABs because of their
deleterious impact on the quality of resulting financial information).

185

The Hierarchy of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ¶ A10 (FASB 2005), available at
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175821377716&blobheader=appl
ication%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.

186

187

Id.

262

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 16

principle. Given the legal requirements for preparers and auditors
to certify . . . whether the financial statements fairly present . . . we
believe that the FASB should . . . provide requirements and
guidance for the use of the term “fair presentation” in
conjunction with US GAAP.188
David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, agreed:
. . . [W]e strongly believe that [GAAP] should . . . include a
requirement for the enterprise to consider fair presentation . . .
and provide guidance for making judgments about it. If literal
compliance with the individual accounting and financial reporting
standards would lead to misleading financial statements . . . the
enterprise should depart from [them] . . . to achieve fair
presentation.189
The New York State Society of CPAs and its German equivalent lodged similar
objections.190 No matter, the FASB and PCAOB forged ahead, effectively
sidelining professional judgment in public companies’ choice of accounting
principles.191

188 Letter from Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens to FASB (Jul. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175817846735&blobheader=appl
ication%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs (noting that the FASB’s move “leaves
the impression that the application of US GAAP is a mechanical exercise”).

Letter from David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, to FASB 1 (Jun. 27,
2005),
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blo
bwhere=1175817846897&blobheader=application%2Fpdf.
189

Letter from NYSSCPA to FASB 5 (Jun. 23, 2005), available at
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175817847702&blobheader=appl
ication%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs (asserting that “fair presentation”
should extend to “circumstances in which . . . GAAP renders the financial statements
misleading”); Letter from Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer to FASB 3-6 (Jun. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobnocache=true&blobwhere=117581784741
9&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobheadername2=ContentLength&blobheadername1=ContentDisposition&blobheadervalue2=722818&blobheadervalue1=filename%3D33162.pdf&blobcol=u
rldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs (arguing that the FASB proposal disregards legal realities and
international consensus that strict GAAP adherence can violate fair presentation).
190

191 STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 162: THE HIERARCHY OF
GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES ¶¶ 3-5 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2008),
available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas162.pdf (divesting the AICPA of authority over GAAP
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2. Critiques of FASB-GAAP
Criticism of FASB GAAP has been widespread and sustained. A 1996
article argued that conformity with FASB GAAP “is almost a guarantee” that the
financial statements are not fairly presented.192 Others have labeled FASB GAAP
and the FASB’s effort to curtail use of AICPA Rule 203 politically motivated.193
The critiques extend to even the most recent standards. For example, one public
company CFO warned that an incoming FASB revenue standard will weaken the
cash-flow predictive properties of revenue, increase fraud risk, and require “nonGAAP measures . . . [to] assess the economic performance” of the company.194
One legal commentator argued that “both GAAP and GAAS have serious
flaws . . .” and “have facilitated and even encouraged the recent accounting
scandals.”195 Another warned lawyers to stay out of negotiations between clients

hierarchy and prescribing sources of GAAP). See also generally STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 168 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2009) (categorizing the FASB
CODIFICATION contents as “authoritative” GAAP and everything else as “non-authoritative”).
[hereinafter SFAS No. 168].
Ronald M. Mano, Mark Anderson, Vicki Nycum & Kevin McBeth, Fairly Presented, in Accordance
With GAAP: What Does It Really Mean?, MGMT. ACCT., Jul. 1996, at 44, 44.

192

See Paul B.W. Miller & Paul R. Bahnson, Dumping Rule 203 exceptions: FASB’s troubling move,
ACCT. TODAY, Jul. 11-24, 2005, at 12-13; Paul B.W. Miller & Paul R. Bahnson, Rule 203 exceptions
could prevent future Enrons, ACCT. TODAY, Jul. 25-Aug. 7, 2005, at 14, 16-17; Paul B.W. Miller & Paul
R. Bahnson, PEAP: Proof that FASB has faulty premise on 203, ACCT. TODAY, Aug. 8-21, 2005, at 14,
16-17; Paul B.W. Miller & Paul R. Bahnson, WYWAP: When GAAP meets Alice’s restaurant, ACCT.
TODAY, Aug. 22-Sep. 4, 2005, at 12, 15 & 20; Paul B.W. Miller & Paul R. Bahnson, POOP: Not
what the world needs, but what it gets, ACCT. TODAY, Sep. 5-25, 2005, at 14, & 22; Paul B.W. Miller &
Paul R. Bahnson, Newsflash: Is FASB ready to close its doors?, ACCT. TODAY, Sep. 26-Oct. 9, 2005, at
14, 16-17. See also EUGENE E. COMISKEY, CHARLES W. MULFORD & JOSHUA A. THOMASON, THE
POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ELIMINATION OF LIFO AS A PART OF IFRS CONVERGENCE
6-7
(Georgia
Tech
Financial
Analysis
Lab
2008),
available
at
https://smartech.gatech.edu/handle/1853/26316 (illustrating distortions of tax-motivated LIFO
accounting with examples like Tesoro Corp., whose LIFO-induced inventory understatement
equaled 45 percent of 2007 shareholders’ equity).

193

Letter from Doug French, VP Corporate Accounting & Financial Reporting, TELUS
Corporation, Inc. to IASB 4 (Mar. 13, 2012) (Letter No. 283), available at
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/CommentLetter_C/CommentLetterPage&cid=1218220137090
&project_id=2011-230&page_number=3.

194

Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the PSLRA, 39 CONN. L. REV.
1097, 1108 (2007).

195
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and auditors over FASB GAAP numbers because of their complexity and
subjectivity.196
Whether or not GAAP financial statements are by definition misleading,
recent research suggests that GAAP is often used to mislead. A 2013 survey found
that roughly 20 percent of firms “use discretion within GAAP” to misrepresent
earnings by approximately 10 percent,197 with 60 percent of the manipulation
increasing and 40 percent decreasing earnings.198 The study cited acquisition
accounting, consolidation, and revenue recognition as frequent manipulation
contexts199 and quoted one CFO who had “watched numerous managements
earn big incentives” by booking larger-than-necessary acquisition-related reserves
later used to juice earnings in subsequent periods.200 The same survey found most
CFOs believe earnings quality would improve if regulators would issue fewer
rules201 and allow “reporting choices” to “evolve from practice.”202 On the other
hand, several cited fears of litigation to justify the current regime, while another—
William O. Fisher, Lawyers Keep Out: Why Attorneys Should Not Participate in Negotiating Critical
Financial Numbers Reported by Public Company Clients, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1501 (2010).
196

197 Dichev et al., supra note 2, at 3-4, 35-36. The survey asked, “From your impressions of
companies in general, in any given year, what percentage of companies use discretion within
GAAP to report earnings which misrepresent the economic performance of the
business?__%.[sic]” Id. at 35, 68. See also CENTER FOR AUDIT QUALITY, MAIN STREET INVESTOR
SURVEY DATA, Q10 at 6 (2012) (reporting that from 2007 to 2012 the percentage of investors
who claim “quite a bit” or “a great deal” of confidence in audited financial information fell from
38 to 28, while the share of those claiming “very little” or no confidence grew from 16 to 25).
198

Dichev et al., supra note 2, at 44.

199

Id. at 44-45.

Id. at 44 (“[They [the reserves] are set up at the time of the acquisition . . . but they’re an
estimate at that point in time. When the future happens then you take charges against that . . . it’s
going to be (imprecise) but whenever I have seen this it was always less than what got set up, so it
got released into favorable earnings . . . [and] did impact the earnings and sometimes for . . . twothree years because they were big acquisitions.”)
200

201

Id. at 29.

202 Id. at 29-31 (“Almost every interviewed CFO regretted the decline of the earlier bottom-up
system of developing GAAP . . . ,” including one who said, “The rules are so prescriptive that
they override and supersede your judgment, and you end up with things that don’t really reflect
the economic substance of the transaction, but you have to account for it in the way that’s
described by the rules.”). See also S.P. Kothari, Karthik Ramanna, Douglas J. Skinner, Implications
for GAAP from an analysis of positive research in accounting, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 246, 272 (2010) (“If
capture theory [of accounting standards regulation] is correct, the policy implication is to stop
producing de jure GAAP and return to a de facto GAAP that arises from accounting practices with
long-run survival value.”).
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apparently unaware of Jeff Skilling’s and John Rigas’ ill-advised reliance on
compliance—observed, “We live in a litigious society so people would prefer to
have prescriptive guidance, so they can say they followed the rules.”203
A trio of recent studies concluded that for predicting future operating
cash flows, current FASB GAAP earnings are inferior to current operating cash
flows,204 implying that thousands of pages of FASB rules dedicated to measuring
“earnings” provide no incremental information value.
Another study noted that increasingly detailed SEC, FASB and PCAOB
rules have reduced neither the number nor severity of accounting scandals. The
study opined that standards-setting is now a “pseudoscience” governed by
ideology and politics,205 and it recommended that accounting methods should be
developed, in part, through decentralized field testing of innovations in different
countries rather than imposed by regulatory fiat.206Another author decried

Dichev et al., supra note 2 at 31 (emphasis added). See also Glen L. Gray, Jerry L. Turner, Paul J.
Coram, & Theodore J. Mock, Perceptions and Misperceptions Regarding the Unqualified Auditor’s Report by
Financial Statement Preparers, Users, and Auditors, 25 ACCT. HORIZONS 659, 670 (2011) (finding that
non-professional investors “never use the financial statements,” preferring The Value Line
Investment Survey or the Motley Fool as “important inputs to investment decisions.”). But see
Kathleen L. Casey, Comm'r, SEC, Lessons from the Financial Crisis for Financial Reporting,
Standard
Setting
and
Rule
Making
(Nov.
17,
2009),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch111709klc.htm (asserting that the stability of
financial markets depends on the transparency of financial statements).

203

Kenneth S. Lorek & G. Lee Willinger, Multi-Step-Ahead Quarterly Cash-Flow Prediction Models, 25
ACCT. HORIZONS 71, 73 (2011) (finding cash-flow-based quarterly prediction models superior
because of “noisy” subjective estimates embedded in FASB GAAP earnings); Baruch Lev, Siyi Li
& Theodore Sougiannis, The usefulness of accounting estimates for predicting cash flows and earnings, 15 REV.
ACCT. STUD. 779, 783 (2010) (“accounting estimates do not improve the prediction of future cash
flows”); Kenneth S. Lorek & G. Lee Willinger, New evidence pertaining to the prediction of operating cash
flows, 32 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 1, 3, 13-14 (2009) (finding annual cash flow-based
prediction models “significantly more accurate” than earnings-based models). But see Myungsun
Kim & William Kross, The Ability of Earnings to Predict Future Operating Cash Flows Has Been
Increasing—Not Decreasing, 43 J. ACCT. RES. 753, 754-755 (2005) (relying on algorithmic
approximations of operating cash flows in finding that “the ability of earnings to forecast future
(operating) cash flows” generally increased between 1973 and 2000).

204

Sudipta Basu, How Can Accounting Researchers Become More Innovative?, 26 ACCT. HORIZONS 851,
858 (2012).

205

206

Id.

266

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 16

GAAP’s role as the only information source for decision makers207 in part
because GAAP’s mathematical linearity cannot reflect non-linear market
realities.208
3. Legal Misconceptions
Case law and legal commentary reveal fundamental misconceptions about
SEC rules and accounting. A 1977 law review note cited the AICPA Accounting
Principles Board (APB) as authority for the erroneous assertion that GAAP
financial statements “disclose the current economic status of an enterprise.”209
The reality? In markets where asset values constantly fluctuate, historical costbased GAAP statements published weeks or months after the fact cannot
possibly reveal “current economic status.”210
In 2006, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals—which, among all U.S.
courts, should be most knowledgeable in this area—propagated the following
quartet of financial reporting fallacies in affirming the convictions of former
WorldCom CEO Bernie Ebbers: (a) all misleading financial statements violate
GAAP, (b) GAAP admits that application of some GAAP rules may produce
misleading financial statements, (c) GAAP states that all misleading financial
statements fail to present fairly, and (d) GAAP requires that financial statements
“accurately reflect the financial status of the company.”211
In Skilling, two defense accounting experts wrongly characterized as
binding law SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99 on materiality. The
John Christensen, Accounting Errors and Errors of Accounting, 85 ACCT. REV. 1827, 1828, 1833-36
(2010).
207

208

Id. at 1830-33.

Note, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles: Instruction H(f) and the Preferability Issue, 11 VAL. U. L.
REV. 229, 229 n.5 (1977).
209

210 See Charles E. Jordan, Stanley J. Clark & Gwen R. Pate, The Debate over Fair Value Reporting,
CPA J., Feb. 2013, at 46. Fewer assets are reported at historical cost today than in 1977 but
historical cost remains the default. Id. (asserting that fair value accounting “will likely become the
primary reporting basis” in future). See also Shalala v. Guernsey Mem. Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 101
(1995) (citing ROBERT S. KAY & D. GERALD SEARFOSS, HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND
AUDITING 7 (2d ed. 1989)) (finding that GAAP “do[es] not necessarily parallel economic reality”
and is not a “lucid,” “encyclopedic” or “single-source accounting rulebook”).

United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 126 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1274 (2007). The court
also stated without citation to authority, “Good faith compliance with GAAP will permit
professionals who study the firm and understand GAAP to accurately assess the financial
condition of the company.” Id. at 125.
211
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reality is that like all SABs, SAB No. 99 reveals only the non-binding opinions of
SEC staff.212
In 2007, an attorney with considerable accounting and securities law
expertise cited a prominent securities litigator who, in turn, misquoted SOX
Section 103(a)(3) for the proposition that the PCAOB was created to “regulate
and discipline the accounting industry” and is now the “ultimate arbiter of
accounting standards.”213 In fact, Section 103(a)(3) authorizes the PCAOB to
write and enforce only auditing (not accounting) standards and these are applicable
only to audits and auditors of SEC registrants.214 That so many well-trained minds
could harbor such fundamental errors suggests that the SEC’s FASB-GAAPbased financial reporting model misleads those it purports to inform.

B. Fair Presentation Standards
While federal courts play a role in judging the overall fairness of financial
statements, the primary regulatory players are the SEC, PCAOB, AICPA, FASB,
and IASB, whose current standards are discussed below. 215
1. AICPA
In the United States, AICPA auditing standards apply only to audits that
are performed by AICPA members and are not under PCAOB jurisdiction.216
Skilling Transcript at 16512, 16849-16850. Jerry Arnold testified, “[S]enior [SEC] accounting
staff put out interpretations of how things should be done. Those are binding, and they label them
SABs . . . This is Number 99. . . .” Id. at 16512. Walter Rush testified that SAB No. 99 “is an
important rule.” Id. at 16849. SABs are drafted without public notice, comment, or Commission
vote and are, therefore, not binding. See Kurt S. Schulzke, Gerlinde Berger-Walliser & Pier Luigi
Marchini, Lexis Nexus Complexus: Comparative Contract Law and International Accounting Collide in the
IASB–FASB Revenue Recognition Exposure Draft, 46 Vand. J. Trans. L. 515, 524 (2013).

212

Mark, supra note 188, at 1109 (citing Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 133 (2002)); see also Arthur Acevedo,
Responsible Profitability? Not on My Balance Sheet!, 61 CATH. U.L. REV. 651, 690 (2012) (erroneously
attributing the power of “accounting legislation” to the PCAOB). SOX Section 108, entitled
“Accounting Standards,” creates a rubric under which the FASB’s designation as a U.S.
accounting standards setter was nearly inevitable. SOX § 108.

213

214

SOX § 101(a) and (c).

FASB and IASB merely set norms, leaving enforcement to adopting governments. SEC,
PCAOB, DOJ, AICPA and state agencies enforce these norms in the United States. Outside the
United States, enforcers and enforcement vary. This article groups the PCAOB together with
AICPA and FASB because of the PCAOB’s quasi-non-governmental status.

215
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According to section 200 of the AU-C, audits should deliver “an opinion by the
auditor on whether the financial statements are presented fairly, in all material
respects, in accordance with an applicable financial reporting framework,”217 thus
signaling acceptance of multiple frameworks.
AU-C § 320 defines materiality as dependent on user information needs
with the (highly idealistic) caveats that users (a) have a “reasonable knowledge of
business, economic activities, and accounting and a willingness to study the
information in the financial statements with reasonable diligence” and (b) “make
reasonable economic decisions” based on the financial statements, while (c)
appreciating the uncertainty inherent in such information.218 This nuanced
definition of materiality could hardly be more different from that propounded to
the Skilling jury. It is also missing entirely from AICPA and PCAOB standard
audit reports.219
216AICPA

Code,
ET
Appendix
A,
available
at
http://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/CodeofConduct/Pages/et_appendixes.aspx.
(authorizing the PCAOB and AICPA Auditing Standards Board to issue auditing standards for
audits of SEC registrants and non-SEC registrants, respectively). Financial statements are generally
not required of non-registrants. However, of 4,004 small businesses recently surveyed, 496 used
financial statements compiled, reviewed, and/or audited by an accountant. Kristian D. Allee &
Teri Lombardi Yohn, The Demand for Financial Statements in an Unregulated Environment: An
Examination of the Production and Use of Financial Statements by Privately Held Small Businesses, 84 ACCT.
REV. 1, 8 (2009).
CLARIFIED STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS, AU-C § 200.04 (Am. Inst. of Certified
Pub. Accountants 2014) (emphasis added). See also AU-C § 700.13 (2014) (restating the elements
of § 200.04 as mandatory requirements); AU-C § 700.35 (2014) (requiring “unmodified” audit
opinions to expressly state that the financial statements are presented fairly.) A “financial
reporting framework” guides the “measurement, recognition, presentation, and disclosure of all
material items appearing in the financial statements,” like FASB GAAP, IFRS, or other “special
purpose” frameworks. AU-C § 200.14. A fair presentation framework is one that recognizes extraframework disclosures or outright departures as sometimes necessary to achieve fair presentation.
Id. The AICPA recently promulgated “clarified” auditing standards designated “AU-C.” AICPA,
Clarified
Statements
on
Auditing
Standards,
available
at
http://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/Pages/clarifiedSAS.aspx. This Article
identifies PCAOB and AICPA auditing standards as “PCAOB AU,” “AICPA AU,” “AU,” or
“AU-C,” as context requires. PCAOB auditing standards are available at
http://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/default.aspx.
217

218

AU-C § 320

See AICPA, Illustration 1 —An Auditor’s Report on Consolidated Comparative Financial Statements
Prepared in Accordance With Accounting Principles Generally Accepted in the United States of America, AU-C
§
700.A58,
available
at
http://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/DownloadableDocuments/AU-C219
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The phrase “fair presentation” appears more than fifty times in AU-C §
200 and AU-C § 700 combined, yet its meaning is left mostly to the reader’s
imagination. For example, AU-C § 700 states that auditors “should also” consider
“the overall presentation, structure, and content of the financial statements,”
and—with a circular flourish—whether the statements and notes “represent the
underlying transactions and events in a manner that achieves fair presentation.”220
AICPA Rule 203, while not expressly citing fair presentation, authorizes
auditors to approve departures from FASB GAAP if the auditor “can
demonstrate that due to unusual circumstances the financial statements or data
would otherwise have been misleading.”221 In 2012, Interpretation 203.02 added
that “when the literal application of GAAP would have the effect of rendering
financial statements misleading . . . the proper accounting treatment is that which will
render the financial statements not misleading.”222 Presumably, “proper
accounting” is distinct from “generally accepted,” “generally regarded,” and
“fairly presented.”
AICPA Rule 203 and Interpretation 203.02 show that the AICPA believes
GAAP is sometimes incapable of producing financial statements that are not
misleading. An SEC Chief Accountant, a Comptroller General of the United
States, numerous accounting scholars, scores of public company CFOs, and the
FEE agree.223 Some private company auditors, who are not subject to PCAOB
strictures, sometimes rely on Rule 203 to depart from FASB GAAP where
compliance would otherwise produce misleading financial statements.224
Discrediting the limitations of Rule 203.02, Rule 203.05 expressly
authorizes “financial reporting frameworks other than GAAP” including
jurisdictional variations of IFRS, accounting frameworks prescribed by contract,

00700.pdf; PCAOB, Reports on Audited Financial Statements, PCAOB AU § 508.08(a)-(j) (1996),
available at http://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/AU508.aspx.
220

AU-C § 700.17.

221

AICPA Rule § 203.01 (2012).

222

AICPA Rule § 203.02 (2012). (emphasis added).

See Miller & Bahnson, supra note 186; ZEFF 2007; FEE, supra note 181; Walker, supra note 182;
Dichev et al., supra note 2.

223

Interview with the managing partner of a large accounting firm based in the southeastern
United States that audits only non-public companies (November 2014).

224
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or “any other comprehensive basis of accounting.”225 GAAP either is or is not the
only “not misleading” accounting framework. AICPA Rule 203.05 says not, that
even non-GAAP accounting can be “not misleading,” and that accountants are
obligated to find and use principles—in or out of GAAP—that do not mislead.
This, in essence, is Simon.
2. PCAOB
The PCAOB requires public company auditors to opine on whether the
financial statements prepared by management226 “present fairly, in all material
respects, an entity's financial position, results of operations, and cash flows in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.”227 On paper, the
PCAOB defines “present fairly” to mean that
(a) the accounting principles selected and applied have general
acceptance; (b) the accounting principles are appropriate in the
circumstances; (c) the financial statements [and] notes, are
informative of matters that may affect their use, understanding,
and interpretation . . .; (d) the information presented . . . is
classified and summarized in a reasonable manner, that is, neither
too detailed nor too condensed . . .; and (e) the financial
statements reflect the underlying transactions and events in a
manner that presents the financial position, results of operations,
and cash flows stated within a range of acceptable limits, that is,
limits that are reasonable and practicable to attain in financial
statements.228

225

AICPA Rule § 203.06 (2012).

PCAOB AU § 508.08(c) (2013). Recently proposed revisions to the standard audit report do
not address the fair presentation issues raised in this Article. See PCAOB, RELEASE NO. 2013-005,
THE AUDITOR'S REPORT ON AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS WHEN THE AUDITOR
EXPRESSES
AN
UNQUALIFIED
OPINION
(2013),
available
at
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Pages/Docket034.aspx. .
226

PCAOB AU § 411.01 (2013). But see PCAOB AU § 508.08(h) (2013). These two provisions
seem to conflict over the meaning of generally accepted accounting principles. Section 508.08(h)
requires U.S. GAAP; section 411.01 allows any GAAP with “country of origin” disclosure.
227

228 PCAOB AU § 411.04. The PCAOB’s definition was taken verbatim from former AICPA AU
§ 411 which was withdrawn in 2008. See PCAOB, Release No. 2008-001, EVALUATING
CONSISTENCY
OF
FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS,
available
at
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket023/PCAOB_Release_No._2008-001_-_Evaluating_Consistency.pdf.
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Thus, consistent with section 320 of the AICPA’s Clarified Statements on
Auditing Standards, the PCAOB—while head-faking in the direction of “use” or
“user needs”—requires auditors to evaluate fair presentation without direct
reference to financial statement objectives.
Here, it bears emphasis that whether a financial statement is misleading is
a function of user needs and expectations. For example, equity investors and
lenders have different risk-reward profiles and need different information to
make investing and lending decisions. Similarly, equity investors themselves differ
in their appetites for risk.
Creating a single set of financial statements that meets the needs of all of
these user groups may be possible and, if so, would require an understanding of
the inferences that members of each group might reasonably draw from
information that could be included in or excluded from the financial statements
coupled with seasoned professional judgment. Yet, despite the endorsement of
professional judgment implicit in “general acceptance,” “appropriate in the
circumstances,” and “range of acceptable limits,” the PCAOB insists that auditors
find fair presentation exclusively within the GAAP framework without which
“the auditor would have no uniform standard for judging the presentation of
financial position.”229
3. FASB
FASB Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts articulate principles
that ostensibly guide the FASB in developing the FASB GAAP now found in the
Codification.230 However, the Codification itself contains no explicit fair
presentation requirement and offers no overall purpose or objective of financial
statements. None of the Codification’s six cursory mentions of fair presentation
addresses financial statements in general. Rather, each is industry or transactionspecific. The phrase “present fairly” appears three times, each implying that
financial statements should present fairly without ever clearly saying so or
assigning responsibility. The term “misleading” appears eleven times—including
three times preceded by “not”— but never in connection with the financial
statements as a whole.

229

PCAOB AU § 411.03.

230

FASB § 105-10-05 (2014). .
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In contrast to the Codification’s murkiness regarding fair presentation,
FASB Concepts Statement No. 8 (Concepts No. 8)231 and its identical IASB twin,
the IASB Conceptual Framework (Framework),232 offer a measure of clarity.
While not outright defining fair presentation, they prescribe financial statements
that are useful in making decisions about providing resources to the reporting
entity233 where “useful” means helpful in assessing “the amount, timing, and
uncertainty of . . . future net cash inflows.”234 Others have reduced this mouthful
to the acronym “AAATUC”.235 Useful information must also be relevant and must
faithfully represent236 economic substance over legal form,237 a combination that
Concepts No. 8 roughly equates to fair presentation.238 Relevance, which includes
materiality,239 implies predictive or confirmatory value.240
Accountants might be expected to apply Concepts No. 8 to actual
financial statements. However, they typically do not for at least two reasons. First,
no direct measure of AAATUC currently exists.241 Second, the FASB, PCAOB,
and SEC prohibit the use of concepts statements by practicing accountants. For
example, in Concepts No. 8, the FASB admits that FASB GAAP may violate
FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 8 [hereinafter Concepts No.
8]
(Sept.
2010),
available
at
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1176157498129&acceptedD
isclaimer=true.
231

See Id. at ¶¶ QC3, QC35-39. Concepts No. 8 was jointly developed by FASB and IASB in part
to “serve the public interest by providing structure and direction to financial accounting and
reporting to facilitate the provision of unbiased financial and related information”. Id.
232

233

Id. at ¶ OB2.

Id. at ¶ OB3. As elegant as Concepts No. 8 sounds, it sets a rather low performance bar:
compared to zero information, any additional information could be described as “useful.”
234

Paul B.W. Miller & Paul R. Bahnson, Continuing the Normative Dialog: Illuminating the
Asset/Liability Theory, 24 ACCT. HORIZONS 419, 431 (2010).
235

236

Concepts No. 8 ¶ QC5.

237

Id. at ¶¶ QC12, BC3.26.

238

Id. at ¶ BC3.44.

239

Id. at ¶ QC11.

Id. at ¶ QC7. “[I]nformation need not be a prediction or forecast to have predictive value [but
may be] employed by users in making their own predictions.” Id. at ¶ QC8.
240

See Miller & Bahnson, supra note 228, at 431 (noting that while AAATUC cannot be directly
measured, fair market values may be used to estimate it because they are “empirically observable
and represent a consensus valuation” by independent parties).
241
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principles contained in concepts statements but warns practitioners not to use
such inconsistencies to justify overriding FASB GAAP to achieve fair
presentation.242 Federal courts, unaware or dismissive of the concepts statements
embargo, have frequently cited them as binding GAAP authority.243
4. IASB
The IASB alternative to FASB GAAP, IFRS, is currently being
considered by the SEC for public U.S. companies.244 More than 450 non-U.S.
companies already file IFRS statements with the SEC.245 In contrast to FASB
GAAP, IFRS expressly requires fair presentation,246 which IFRS defines as “the
faithful representation of the effects of transactions, other events and conditions
in accordance with” the Framework.247
While IFRS compliance is presumed to achieve fair presentation,248 IAS 1
paragraph 19 requires IFRS departures in the “extremely rare circumstances” in
which compliance “would be so misleading [as to] conflict with the objective of
financial statements” prescribed by the Framework.249 Thus, IFRS contrasts with
Concepts No. 8 n.p. (a “Concepts Statement does not establish U.S. GAAP . . . [and] is not
intended to invoke application of [AICPA] Rule 203”).

242

A Sep. 5, 2013 search of the LexisNexis All Federal Courts database for “Statements of
Financial Accounting Concepts” produced 66 separate entries. See, e.g., 228 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir.
2000) (citing FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 2, ¶ 125 (1980));
S.E.C. v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (referring to defendants’ citation to FASB,
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 6 as FASB authority on revenue
recognition); Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 278 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Statement of the SEC,
Amicus Curiae, in Support of Neither Side at 3 (quoting FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 5, ENTERPRISES 15-16, ¶ 22 (Dec. 1984)); Higginbotham v. Baxter
International, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 758 n.+ (7th Cir. 2007) (citing FASB, STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 6).

243

See Michael Rapoport, New SEC Chief Accountant Weighing Switch to Global Accounting Rules, WALL
ST. J. , Nov. 6, 2014, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/new-sec-chief-accountantweighing-switch-to-global-accounting-rules-1415305697.

244

Paul Beswick, SEC Chief Accountant, Remarks at the 32nd Annual SEC and Financial
Reporting Institute Conference (May 30, 2013).

245

246

IAS 1 ¶ 15 (IASB 2012).

247

Id.

248

Id.

249

IAS 1 ¶ 19 (2012)
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FASB GAAP, first, in that IFRS compliance is expressly tied to financial
statement objectives while FASB GAAP compliance is not, and second, in that
PCAOB and FASB standards flatly prohibit fair presentation departures from
FASB GAAP, whereas IAS 1 requires departures from IFRS when necessary to
avoid misleading readers. While the Framework’s objectives have been criticized
as so broad as to render paragraph 19 toothless, 250 the equivalent “true and fair
view” override has long been a statutory standard of financial reporting in the
United Kingdom, as discussed in Part III.
III. FAIR PRESENTATION STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
In the United States, the fair presentation of financial statements is
supported, if at all, by a complex, often internally inconsistent fabric of statutes
and regulations. The central threads are summarized in Part III, together with the
statutory scheme in the United Kingdom.

A. Statutes
Section 11 of the Securities Act imposes civil liability for material
misstatements and omissions in registration statements,251 which are required
prior to the public offering of securities. Thereafter, section 13 of the Exchange
Act prescribes periodic reporting requirements.252 Sections 30A253 and 13(b)(2) of
the Exchange Act, the so-called “accounting provisions” of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA),254 require public companies to (a) keep books that
accurately and fairly reflect transactions,255 and (b) maintain internal accounting
controls to ensure that the financial statements comply with GAAP and other

250 See Christopher Nobes, The importance of being fair: An analysis of IFRS regulation and practice- a
Comment, 39 ACCT. & BUS. RES. 415, 420 (2009). Nobes’ view finds some support in the rarity of
reported public company IAS ¶ 19 overrides, now totaling two cases. Id. at 421-423 (discussing
National Express Group PLC’s 2005, 2006 & 2007 financial statements and Société Générale SA’s
2007 financials).

15 U.S.C. § 77k (2014). Section 12(a)(2) imposes similar liability for untrue statements or
omissions of material facts in prospectuses or oral communications. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (2014).
251

252

15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (2014).

253

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2014).

254

15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2014).

255

15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
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criteria.256 Knowing falsification of records or circumvention of controls triggers
civil and criminal liability.257
SOX Sections 302 and 906 distinguish financial reporting reliability from
GAAP compliance. SOX Section 302 requires a public company’s CEO and CFO
to (a) certify that each annual and quarterly report contains no material
“misleading” factual misstatement or omission258 and that the financial statements
“fairly present in all material respects” the registrant’s financial condition,
operating results, and cash flows;259(b) acknowledge responsibility for the
registrant’s disclosure controls and internal controls over financial reporting; and
(c) certify that they have designed the internal controls “to provide reasonable
assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of
financial statements for external purposes in accordance with [GAAP].”260
SOX Section 906 requires both CEOs and CFOs to certify that periodic
reports containing financial statements comply with section 13(a) of the
Exchange Act and fairly present, in material respects, the issuer’s financial
condition and results of operations.261 On paper, the fines and prison time
imposed for erroneous certification are severe. 262 However, to date, no reported
case has applied these penalties, though the possibility of such may have induced
defendants to settle. In addition, under SOX Section 304, officers of issuers that
publish accounting restatements due to material noncompliance with SEC rules
must disgorge incentive compensation and gains from sales of issuer stock

256

15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B).

15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5). See, e.g., Brown v. U.S., 571 F.3d 492, 494 (5th Cir. 2009) (denying
Merrill Lynch-employee defendants’ motion to dismiss their indictment for conspiracy to falsify
Enron’s books in connection with a Nigerian barge deal).

257

258

15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(2) (2014).

15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(3); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13(a)-14(a), 240.15d-14(a) (2014); 17 C.F.R. §
229.601(b)(31)(i) (2014) (mandating the exact contents of the certifications required by 17 C.F.R.
240.13a-14(a) and 240.15d-14(a)).

259

260

15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4); 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(31)(i). SOX does not define reliability.

18 U.S.C. § 1350(a)-(b) (2014). The SEC rule requiring SOX section 906 certifications is 17
C.F.R. § 240.13a-14(b).

261

Mere “knowing” certification of non-compliant statements yields up to 10 years in prison and
$1,000,000 in fines, whereas “willful” false certification yields up to 20 years and $5,000,000. 18
U.S.C. § 1350(c).
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received during the twelve months following the original publication of the
erroneous financial information.263
Securities fraud is prohibited under both section 17 of the Securities Act
and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the
Securities Act prohibit material untrue factual statements, misleading factual
omissions, and other behavior that would operate as a fraud upon a purchaser, in
connection with an offer or sale of a security.264 Similarly, section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act prohibits the use of any manipulative or deceptive device in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.265 The scope of section 10(b)
has been established in part by SEC Rule 10b-5, whose central theme is that
financial statements must not be materially misleading.266 Willful and knowingly
false and misleading statements made in violation of the Exchange Act or any
regulation thereunder are punishable by up to 20 years in prison and fines up to
$5,000,000.267

B. Regulations
Securities disclosure statutes are implemented in part through reports that
registrants must submit periodically to the SEC. Domestic issuers268 must file
periodic, quarterly, and annual reports269 on Forms 8-K,270 10-Q,271 and 10-K.272
Foreign private issuers (FPIs), 273 which report annually on Form 20-F274 and

263

15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (2014).

264

15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)-(3) (2014).

265

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2014).

266

See 17 C.F.R. 240-10b-5.

267

15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2014).

15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (2014). “Security,” for purposes of federal securities law, is defined in 15
U.S.C. §§ 77b(1), 78c(10).
268

269

15 U.S.C. § 78m(a).

17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (2014). Form 8-K is used to report material events or transactions
arising between 10-Q and 10-K filing deadlines.
270

271

17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13 (2014).

272

17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2014).

273

17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(c) (2014) (defining FPIs).

17 C.F.R. § 249.220f (2014) (requiring FPIs to file Form 20-F within six months of fiscal year
end).
274
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“currently” on Form 6-K,275 have no quarterly obligation. SEC regulations are
internally conflicted over whether and to what extent financial statements filed
with these forms must comply with GAAP or be fairly presented. SEC Rule
210.4-01(a)(1) presumes that non-GAAP financial statements are misleading or
inaccurate despite any mitigating footnote or other disclosures,276 but GAAP is
not clearly defined by statute or regulation. Indeed, Form 20-F financial
statements may be prepared using IFRS, FASB GAAP, or any other
comprehensive set of accounting principles.277 Similarly, SEC FR-70 does not
explicitly derecognize other standards as “not GAAP”. Thus, while non-GAAP
accounting is presumed “misleading or inaccurate,” FASB GAAP is not
presumed accurate, not misleading, or the only GAAP available.
SEC regulations do not require external auditors to opine on fair
presentation or on compliance with GAAP. Rather, they must offer only an
“opinion . . . in respect of the financial statements . . . and the accounting
principles and practices reflected therein”278 and their consistent application. This
requirement differs markedly from the SOX certifications required of CEOs and
CFOs.
Rule 10b-5279 makes it unlawful to “employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud” or to “make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit a
material fact necessary . . . to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading” in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security. 280 While typically deployed against
misleading optimism, Rule10b-5 was written because a company president falsely
talked down his company’s stock.281 Rule 12b-20 requires reports filed with the
SEC to include “further material information. . . as may be necessary to make the
275

17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-16 (2014).

17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(1)(2014). No LexisNexis case annotation mentions an attempt to
challenge this presumption.

276

17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(2) (2014). Regulation G, regulating non-GAAP disclosures, offers
similar guidance. 17 C.F.R. § 244.101(b) (2014).

277

17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02(c)(1) (2014). SEC rules, as applied, require only the signature of the firm,
not the individual auditor. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02(a)(2).

278

279

Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014).

280

Id.

See Lewis D. Solomon & Dan Wilke, Securities Professionals and Rule 10b-5: Legal Standards, Industry
Practices, Preventative Guidelines and Proposals for Reform, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 505, 509 n.12 (1975).
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required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading.”282 In these regulations, the operative phrase is “not misleading”.
Fair presentation is not mentioned.

C. U.K. Law
The United Kingdom offers a working example of a financial market
similar to that of the United States wherein a fair presentation equivalent—
known as “true and fair view” (TFV)—has been statutorily prioritized over
GAAP compliance since 1947.283 In broad terms, the relevant differences
between the United Kingdom and United States are few. The countries’ legal and
accounting professions share common law heritage, legal procedure, and
regulatory environment. Their capital markets, though of different scales,284 are
roughly equivalent in terms of the concentration of ownership in publicly traded
companies285 and market capitalization in relation to GDP.286 Both countries
periodically experience large-scale financial reporting fraud,287 though the
comparative local impact of fraud is not clear.
17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2014). The phrase “not misleading” currently appears ninety times in
Title 17 of the C.F.R. However, the scope of required information disclosures may be limited by
an SEC Confidential Treatment Order (CTO). 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-2 (2014). A March 2, 2014
search of the SEC’s EDGAR database returned 1,095 Confidential Treatment Orders filed since
2008. CTOs have been criticized for depriving investors and creditors of highly material
information. See, e.g., Nadelle Grossman, Out of the Shadows: Requiring Strategic Management Disclosure,
116 W. VA. L. REV. 197 (2013) (advocating disclosure of strategic management processes to the
same extent as risk management).
282

283 See GEORGE BOMPAS QC, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS ¶ 12 ( 2013),
available at http://www.lapfforum.org/TTx2/press/ifrs-opinion (reciting the 1947 statutory debut
of “true and fair view” as a “paramount requirement” in the Companies Act 1947, Sections 13
and 16).

The 2012 U.K. and U.S. stock market capitalization was $3,019 and $18,668 billion,
respectively. See THEGLOBALECONOMY.COM, http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/economies/
(last visited Nov. 25, 2014).
284

See Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 J.
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 117, 118-19 (2007) (reporting the 1995 proportions of “widely held” firms
among the largest twenty firms in the U.S. and U.K. as 80 and 100 percent, respectively).
285

The 2012 U.K. and U.S. stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP was 123 and 115
percent,
respectively.
See
THEGLOBALECONOMY.COM,
http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/economies (last visited Nov. 25, 2014).
286

287 Leading U.S. fraud cases are discussed in Part I. In the United Kingdom, Walmart competitor
Tesco is currently under investigation by the Serious Fraud Office [hereinafter SFO] for alleged
revenue accounting fraud. See Peter Evans, Tesco Fraud Investigation Opened, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29,
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Despite the similarities, one regulatory difference stands out: In the
United Kingdom, a single, independent entity, the Financial Reporting Council
(FRC), sets and enforces U.K. standards for corporate reporting (including
accounting standards), auditing, and corporate governance.288 In the United
States, these responsibilities are divided among three organizations: FASB,
PCAOB, and SEC. One result of the U.K. “united command” structure is
consistency—notably lacking in the United States—between accounting and
auditing standards and between the two sets of standards and their enforcement.
The United Kingdom, as a European Union (EU) member, is subject to
EU law. The EU Accounting Directive (Directive) requires member states to
ensure that financial statements “give a true and fair view” (TFV) of the firm’s
financial position (shown in the balance sheet) and profit or loss (portrayed in the
income statement), regardless of company size or accounting framework.289 In
exceptional cases where application of the relevant accounting framework fails to
deliver a TFV, the Directive requires that companies do so by departing from the
framework.290
The EU’s IAS Regulation obligates public U.K. companies to follow
IFRS in their consolidated statements.291 Otherwise, companies are free to choose

2014), available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-k-s-sfo-to-investigate-tesco-1414593597
(outlining the SFO’s jurisdiction over the investigation and its accounting provenance). See also
SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, (2015) available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/ (describing the
responsibilities of the SFO).
About the FRC, FRC.ORG.UK, https://www.frc.org.uk/About-the-FRC.aspx (last visited Oct. 3,
2014); Memorandum from Stephen Haddrill, for the FRC, and David Lawton, for the FCA, (April
2, 2013), available at https://frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/FRC-Board/Memorandum-ofUnderstanding-between-the-Financial.pdf (describing responsibilities of FRC).

288

Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on the
Annual Financial Statements, Consolidated Financial Statements, and Related Reports of Certain
Types of Undertakings and amending Directive 2006/43/EC O.J. (L 182) 29, art. 4 [hereinafter
Directive]. See also MARTIN MOORE QC, INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND THE
TRUE AND FAIR VIEW. ¶¶ 41-61 ( 2013) [hereinafter Moore 2013], available at
https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/FRC-Board/Martin-Moore-QC-Opinion-3-October-2013.pdf
(explicating the relationship between prudence and true and fair view and arguing that the latter
can exist without the first).

289

Directive at 20 ¶ 9. See also Moore 2013 (arguing that this so-called “true and fair” override
survived the replacement of “true and fair view” with “fair presentation” in the updated IAS 1).

290

291

Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 403(1) (Eng.).
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between IFRS or Companies Act 2006 accounting frameworks.292 As discussed in
Part II, IAS 1 paragraph 19 requires IFRS-compliant firms to depart from IFRS
in order to correct misleading financial statements.
No matter the accounting framework, TFV continues to be the U.K.
financial reporting lodestar. Unlike the SEC, the FRC has consistently and
unambiguously defended the TFV override as essential to quality financial
reporting.293 Nevertheless, in the wake of the IASB’s recent replacement of TFV
with fair presentation, the applicability of TFV to IFRS financial statements has
been energetically debated, most visibly through dueling Queens Counsel (QC)
opinions commissioned by the Local Authority Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF)294
and the FRC. 295
TFV is not defined in EU or U.K. legislation but has been equated by
leading British commentators to fair presentation296 and usefulness which, in turn,
compromises relevance, reliability, comparability, and understandability.297 A
Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 395 (Eng.) (creating the accounting option for individual
accounts); Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 403(2) (creating the accounting option for group
accounts).
292

293 See, e.g., FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL [hereinafter FRC], TRUE AND FAIR (2014), available
at https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Accounting-and-Reporting-Policy/True-andFair-June-2014.pdf; FRC, TRUE AND FAIR (2011), https://www.frc.org.uk/FRCDocuments/FRC/Paper-True-and-Fair.pdf; FRC, Importance of true and fair view in both UK GAAP
and IFRS reaffirmed by the Accounting Standards Board and Auditing Practices Board (Jul. 21, 2011),
https://frc.org.uk/News-and-Events/FRC-Press/Press/2011/July/Importance-of-true-and-fairview-in-both-UK-GAAP-a.aspx; FRC, Relevance of ‘True and Fair” concept confirmed (May 19, 2008),
https://frc.org.uk/News-and-Events/FRC-Press/Press/2008/May/Relevance-of-True-and-Fairconcept-confirmed.aspx.

Bompas, supra note 277 (questioning whether companies can both follow IFRS and override it
using TFV).
294

Moore 2013, at ¶¶ 70-82, at 21-26 (rebutting Bompas, supra note 277, and reaffirming the
continuing preeminence of TFV for all U.K. companies). See also FRC, TRUE AND FAIR, supra note
287 (confirming the centrality of true and fair to accounting and auditing).
295

See, e.g., Moore 2013, at ¶ 71 (reaffirming his 2008 assertion that “true and fair view” and “fair
presentation” are equivalent); MARTIN MOORE QC, THE TRUE AND FAIRE REQUIREMENT
REVISITED ¶¶ 28-29 (2008), available at https://www.frc.org.uk/FRC-Documents/FRC/Trueand-Fair-Opinion,-Moore,-21-April-2008.pdf (quoting the IASB Framework for the proposition
that “true and fair” and “present fairly” are synonymous) [hereinafter Moore 2008]; Bompas, supra
note 277, at 22 n.37 (quoting with approval U.K. Minister of Industry and the Regions, Margaret
Hodge MP, to the effect that TFV and fair presentation are equivalent).
296

297

See Moore 2013, at ¶¶ 72-73.
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highly regarded 1983 QC opinion reasoned that TFV requires information in
“sufficient quantity and quality to satisfy the reasonable expectations of the
readers to whom [it is] addressed” and that because reader expectations are in
part a function of customary accounting practice, so is TFV.298
Further emphasizing TFV’s importance, the Companies Act 2006 requires
auditors to opine separately on whether the financial statements (a) “give a true
and fair view” of profit and loss (income statement) and “state of affairs”
(balance sheet) and (b) conform to the relevant accounting framework.299 The “a”
in “a true fair view” signifies that TFV is dynamic and flexible, not unique or
absolute,300 in relation to circumstances and reasonable reader expectations.301
Scarce EU and U.K. case law on point generally holds that delivery of a
TFV is of overriding importance, adherence to generally accepted accounting
practices is prima facie evidence of TFV, and GAAP-compliant statements may
fail to deliver a TFV. In contrast to the U.S. question-of-fact approach, whether
financial statements give a TFV is a question of law with respect to which courts
should treat accounting practice as persuasive authority.302
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Since 1942, when the SEC declared that financial statements exist to
perform “the function of enlightenment,” not to comply with GAAP,303 the SEC,
LEONARD HOFFMANN QC & MARY H. ARDEN, LEGAL OPINION OBTAINED BY ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS COMMITTEE OF TRUE AND FAIR VIEW, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE
ROLE OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ¶ 8 (1983), available at https://www.frc.org.uk/FRCDocuments/FRC/True-and-FairOpinionHoffmann-and-Arden-13-Sept.pdf.

298

299

Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 495(3) (Eng.).

300

Supplemental Joint Opinion of Leonard Hoffman QC and MH Arden ¶ 5 (1984).

301

Id. at ¶ 9.

See, e.g., Case C-234/94, Tomberger v. Gebrüder Von Der Wettern, 1996 E.C.R. I-3133 (prioritizing
TFV over the German government’s formalistic view of revenue recognition); Case C-275/97,
DE + ES Bauunternehmung GmbH v Finanzamt Bergheim, 1999 E.C.R. I-5331 ¶ 40 (affirming the
supremacy of TFV over detailed standards); Balloon Promotions Ltd. v. Wilson (Inspector of Taxes),
[2006] S.T.C. (SCD U.K.) 167 ¶ 152 (holding that goodwill “should be construed in accordance
with legal not accountancy principles” because U.K. GAAP’s SSAP 22 is “deficient”); MARY
ARDEN, OPINION: THE TRUE AND FAIR REQUIREMENT ¶ 2 (1993) (stating “whether accounts
satisfy [TFV] is a question of law for the court” about which courts must consider evidence of
accounting practice).

302

303

See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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FASB, and PCAOB have aggressively pushed to eliminate fair presentation and
professional judgment from financial reporting. As a proximate result, accounting
experts have dissociated FASB GAAP from integrity and fairness, while federal
judges have quarantined “accounting materiality” and FASB GAAP as irrelevant
in leading federal securities cases.
Meanwhile, contemporary accounting research questions FASB GAAP’s
accuracy, relevance to investors, and usefulness in predicting future cash flows.
Leaders of the accounting profession, domestic and international, have decried
the U.S. obsession with GAAP compliance. In counterpoise, professionals,
regulators, and courts in the United Kingdom have enshrined TFV as the
overarching financial statement requirement before which even GAAP must bow.
The SEC’s FR-70, FASB GAAP Hierarchy paragraph A10, PCAOB AU
411.04, and standard audit report all mislead by glossing over FASB GAAP’s
practical weaknesses and lack of real general acceptance. By naked diktat, FR-70
declares FASB GAAP “generally accepted.” Paragraph A10 claims that selection
of FASB GAAP principles “results in relevant and reliable financial information”
but fails to anchor relevance to any objective or to acknowledge research
impeaching FASB GAAP’s reliability. PCAOB AU 411.04 requires auditors to
opine on whether the financial statements “are informative of matters that may
affect their use, understanding, and interpretation,” while concealing their
purposelessness and the systemic deficiencies of their FASB GAAP backbone.
Today’s standard U.S. audit opinions are significantly less informative
than those of 1933. Then, auditors certified their belief that the financial
statements were true and not misleading. Until 1962, Andersen auditors opined
separately on fair presentation and compliance, just as their modern U.K.
counterparts separately address TFV. In unflattering contrast, today’s U.S.
auditors coyly concatenate “fairly presented” and “in conformity with GAAP,”
falsely leading readers to infer that these phrases offer separate, meaningful
assurances. At the same time, their audit reports—endorsed by AICPA or
PCAOB—fail to tell readers what they mean by material. Perhaps this is because
the auditors themselves do not know what it means.
After sixty years of haphazard development, the alphabet soup of
essential U.S. securities law terms—including GAAP, materiality, reliability, not
misleading, and fair presentation—lacks generally accepted definitions and internal
coherence. This fog of regulation harms markets and the law by simultaneously
offering cover to accountants seeking to avoid professional responsibility and to
plaintiffs, prosecutors, and courts too eager to stretch the law to their advantage.
For example, the Fifth Circuit’s subjectivist twist on materiality—tying materiality
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to metaphysical musings of the “ordinary man”—introduces arbitrary legal risk
into the calculus of corporate governance thereby endangering free markets and
the rule of law.
The PCAOB’s acceptance of accounting principles from multiple
jurisdictions304 casts FASB GAAP as but one accounting framework among
many. So does SEC Regulation G, which defines GAAP for FPIs as whatever
non-U.S.-GAAP principles the FPI uses in its financial statements.305 AICPA
Rule 203.05, which authorizes literally any comprehensive basis of accounting,
similarly demonstrates the falsity of the PCAOB’s claim that non-FASB-GAAP
standards for judging fair presentation are lacking. They are not lacking. Rather,
they are simply not used.
The Second Circuit’s Ebbers mythology—that FASB GAAP requires that
financial statements be not misleading, recognizes that technical compliance with
particular GAAP rules may produce misleading financial statements, and requires
that financial statements as a whole accurately reflect the financial status of the
company306—is evidence that FASB GAAP misleads even highly educated
readers by promising what it is not designed to deliver.
That bench and bar avoid FASB GAAP is hardly surprising. In federal
securities cases, Simon long ago replaced GAAP with three words: not materially
misleading. Simon and its progeny are the proximate result of the accounting
profession’s single-minded adherence to GAAP and rejection of principled fair
presentation. Remember, “GAAP doesn't talk about misleading. GAAP doesn't
talk about integrity. GAAP talks about accounting rules.”307 No expert could
credibly say this about accounting practice in the United Kingdom, where the
U.K. Companies Act has successfully prioritized TFV over GAAP for several
decades. With U.S. accountants mechanistically following bright-line GAAP and
the legal issue in securities cases reduced to whether financial statements are
“misleading,” accounting experts may understandably be seen as so much
irrelevant sand in the legal machine.
PCAOB AU § 411.01 (2013). Reconciliation of foreign-GAAP net income and shareholders’
equity to equivalent FASB GAAP figures is required for non-IFRS statements. 17 C.F.R. § 210.401(a)(2) (2014). Thus, what prevents U.S. public companies from using IFRS or some other
GAAP is not a PCAOB rule, but FR-70.

304

305

See supra note 271 and accompanying text..

306

U.S. v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1274 (2007).

307

See Skilling Transcript at 16724-823.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Conveniently, TFV under the U.K. Companies Act roughly equates to fair
presentation. At the same time, SOX Sections 302 and 906 already require
company executives to separately certify the fair presentation of their financial
statements. All that remains to convert U.S. public companies to a bona fide fair
presentation model is to clearly define fair presentation and expressly require
accountants to follow the model.
As John C. Burton noted, fair presentation is meaningful only in relation
to financial statement objectives.308 Thus, financial statements could be defined,
by statute or regulation, as fairly presented and therefore not misleading when
they satisfy Concepts No. 8’s three usefulness criteria—helpfulness in predicting
cash flows, relevance, and representational faithfulness—through the eyes of
reasonable equity investors and creditors as defined by AICPA AU-C § 320.
Materiality would serve as a pervasive constraint. Satisfaction of May’s inferential
imperative would signal representational faithfulness and would fully satisfy the
securities law “not misleading” mandate as interpreted by Simon and its progeny.
The model could include a rebuttable presumption that compliance with any
accounting framework achieves fair presentation. Consistent with the IAS 1 and
U.K. Companies Act paradigms, financial statements would be required to depart
from the applicable accounting framework whenever necessary to achieve fair
presentation. Thus, financial statements and audit reports would say what they
mean and mean what they say, offering users the best available information in the
core financial statements and thereby rendering remedial disclosure unnecessary.
Beyond mandating fair presentation, Congress should statutorily decide
what auditors and company officers must tell financial statement readers about it
and its relationship to GAAP compliance. Even in the United Kingdom, where
courts have made law for nearly a millennium, Parliament statutorily controls this
question. Currently, SEC regulations do not require auditors to opine on fair
presentation, GAAP compliance, or not misleading status. SOX requires officers
to certify all three while, in contrast, the PCAOB and AICPA allow auditors to
ignore “not misleading.” Statutory definition of fair presentation as outlined
above would resolve these inconsistencies and redundancies. It should be paired
with the requirement that audit opinions separately address fair presentation and
compliance in a manner consistent with the U.K. Companies Act.
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Absent these recommended reforms, the best protection for accountants
is May- and Burton-style fair presentation. Case law warns that the putative
GAAP safe harbor is illusory. Taking FASB GAAP and other SEC model
elements as they now are, audit opinions that satisfy Simon and current PCAOB
requirements309 should include language like the following:
In our opinion, the accompanying financial statements meet the
usefulness criteria of FASB Concepts No. 8 and the fair presentation
requirements of PCAOB AU 411.04 in all material respects, where “material” is
defined by AICPA AU-C § 320 which assumes that readers have reasonable
knowledge of business and accounting, diligently study the financial statements
and appreciate their inherent uncertainty. They were prepared in accordance with
the FASB Codification, except as explained in Note X, and provide probabilistic
estimates, within practical limits, of the Company’s historical financial position,
earnings, and cash flows based partly on historical transaction amounts and partly
on fair values as of the balance sheet date.
Advocates of the status quo may argue that these proposals would lead to
chaos for analysts, investors and accountants confronted with a multiplicity of
accounting frameworks and audit opinions. But the status quo is chaos. In court,
costly FASB GAAP expert testimony is dismissed as irrelevant while defendants
suddenly confront unforeseen legal exposure. Similarly, latent chaos lurks in the
market where misleading FASB GAAP financial statements misinform investors
and periodically precipitate debilitating financial shocks like Enron, Worldcom, and
Lehman.
Public companies and their auditors should be unambiguously obligated
to depart from FASB GAAP when necessary to avoid misleading readers. Nonpublic and non-U.S. companies already are, with the blessing of SEC, PCAOB
and AICPA. As a side benefit, practical access to a fair presentation override for
U.S. public companies can be expected to openly highlight misleading FASB
GAAP and thereby hasten positive change.
FASB apologists may counter that fair presentation can always be finagled
within FASB GAAP. Yet, the extensive record—including the FASB’s response
to Lehman—suggests that FASB, SEC, PCAOB and U.S. accounting profession
know otherwise. Meanwhile, the unitary U.K. regulator points clearly and
consistently to true and fair view and fair presentation.
309

See PCAOB AU § 411.04.

286

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 16

For the good of markets and securities litigants, accountants should be
taken seriously in court but only if they exercise independent professional
judgment in preparing and auditing financial statements. Eight decades of brightline SEC regulation have proven what George May, the AIA, and J.M.B. Hoxsey
knew in 1933. “There is no dispensing with judgment in the preparation of
accounts,” “uniform financial statements simply will not solve the problem,” and
investors are “deceived, rather than protected, by such requirements.”310 Beyond
deceiving investors, uniformity shrinks the arena for exercise of professional
judgment about which courts might solicit expert testimony. Benchmarking
financial statement fair presentation against Concepts No. 8 would better inform
financial statement users, require accountants to take professional responsibility
for their decisions, and make expert accounting testimony more relevant and
compelling in U.S. courtrooms.

Memorandum from George O. May to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency
4-5 (Mar. 10, 1934) (on file with author).
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